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Destabilizing Property
EZRA ROSSER
Property theory has entered into uncertain times. Conservative and
progressive scholars are, it seems, fiercely contesting everything, from
what is at the core of property to what obligations owners owe society.
Fundamentally, the debate is about whether property law works.
Conservatives believe that property law works. Progressives believe
property law could and should work, though it needs to be made more
inclusive. While there have been numerous responses to the conservative
emphasis on exclusion, this Article begins by addressing a related line of
argument, the recent attacks information theorists have made on the
bundle of rights conception of property. This Article goes on to make two
main contributions to the literature: it gives a new critique of progressive
property and, more fundamentally, shows how distribution challenges in
property call for a third path forward. Conservative scholarship is
scholarship for property, defending traditional views of property against
the influence of new realist-inspired deconstruction. Progressive
scholarship works with property, showing how doctrine supports
expanding property law to reach those who would otherwise be excluded.
But missing from this debate is the possibility that, instead of working for
or with property, the rise in inequality and the calcification of advantages
defined at birth of the current economic and legal environment calls for
work against property. Expanding the range of answers to the broad
questions being asked of property to include deliberately destabilizing
property would add to the academic debate and to the possible policy
responses to the emerging threat of oligarchy. Working for, with, and
against property are all answers to the question of how to respond to the
property crisis of our time, the problem of inequality. This Article seeks to
give some content to the neglected against portion of the spectrum.
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Destabilizing Property
EZRA ROSSER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Property theory has entered into uncertain times. Conservative and
progressive scholars are, it seems, fiercely contesting everything, from
what is at the core of property to what obligations owners owe society.
This contest is not a matter of happenstance, of decontextualized scholarly
pontification. Instead, the scholarly debates mirror similar upheavals in the
role property plays in the lives of many Americans. The Great Recession is
but a stark reminder that the American Dream is fragile. Working-class
families have not seen significant welfare improvements in over a
generation, even as the wealthy have consolidated their economic
advantages. The New Gilded Age is defined largely by rising inequality,
but it should not be surprising that property law scholarship has become
more contentious and has taken on bigger questions as the clouds
surrounding property’s role in society darken. There is a place for purely
theoretical scholarship, but a field that does not engage in the questions of
the day would be neglecting an important aspect of the academic exercise.
When it comes to property, the questions of the day revolve around
inequality, and this is reflected in the broad nature of the questions scholars
are asking of property law. But, while the questions are broad, the answers
are too narrow.
The back-and-forth between conservatives and progressives formally
centers on whether property law is best understood in terms of clear-cut
rules or messy, multi-layered standards and exceptions. But, more
fundamentally, the debate is about whether property law works.
Conservative information cost theorists believe that property law works.
Progressives believe property law could and should work, though it needs
to be made more inclusive. Scholarship from both camps is shaped
*
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National Poverty Center, University of Michigan. For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts,
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accordingly. Conservative scholarship is scholarship for property,
defending traditional views of property against the influence of realistinspired deconstruction. Conservative scholars argue that their models
better describe property law and draw upon that descriptive accuracy to
ground normative claims that celebrate the status quo through declarations
that the current rules are efficient, good rules.1 Progressive scholarship
works with property, showing how doctrine supports expanding property
law to reach those who would otherwise be excluded, and highlighting
areas in which social values have created exceptions that deviate from an
exclusion-centric understanding of property law. Put differently, while
conservative scholars gaze upon the edifice of property law and applaud it,
progressive scholars seek improvements to the law rather than
retrenchment.2 But missing from this debate is the possibility that, instead
of working for or with property, the rise of inequality and the calcification
of advantages defined at birth of the current economic and legal
environment calls for work against property. Working against private,
exclusion-based property can take many forms, including selectively
leveraging doctrine in support of broad market access and in defense of
poor communities. Where the doctrine proves inadequate, confrontation
and resistance to the oppressive features of the law may be required.
Expanding the range of answers to the broad questions being asked of
property to include deliberately destabilizing property would add to the
academic debate and to the range of possible policy responses to the
emerging threat of oligarchy.
The idea of destabilizing property is not inherently radical. The
relationship between property law and the capitalist market that is taken for
granted today itself contains features that were seen as radical when they
were first introduced. Feudalism gave way to capitalism, in part, because
use rights and alienation of land went from things that were sharply
limited, to matters of individual freedom that were expected “sticks” in the
bundle of rights.3 Similarly, the economic system built around slave labor
was undone, in part, because of a rejection, first by activists and later by
politicians, of the idea that Southerners could own humans as property.
Destabilizing property is only radical from a vantage point that privileges
1
See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1692 (2012)
(arguing that “traditional baselines . . . are very worthy of explanation and a good deal of respect”). But
see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1560 (2003) (arguing that “[t]o
avoid the pitfalls of essentializing the existing repertoire of property forms, however, we must avoid
according these forms overwhelming normative authority”).
2
See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 923 (2010)
(arguing that progressive scholars are “far more open to quick interventions to improve the system”).
3
See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 456–57 (2014) (explaining that
feudal property was replaced by “allodial” property, or property that is free of any obligation of fealty
to a lord or superior).
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existing institutions and understandings of property. But if that is the
vantage point, then, yes, there is something radical about the argument that
the extent to which the property of the wealthy is protected ought to
depend upon the availability of similar benefits to the rest of the
population. Much less radical is the observation that property law occupies
a troubling space in the ongoing crisis of capitalism and the distribution of
property. If property law is built, in part, upon the premise that its benefits
either are widely shared or are available to all who strive for them, the
problems plaguing the current economic structure—inequitable
opportunities, wage and wealth stagnation or decline, persistent multigenerational poverty, and lack of economic mobility—raise the possibility
that property law serves a sliver of the population well, but does not serve
society well. Working for, with, and against property are all answers to the
question of how to respond to the property crisis of our time: the problem
of inequality. This Article seeks to give some content to the neglected
against portion of the spectrum.
As is true of American politics generally, the conservative-progressive
binary in property theory does a disservice to the legitimacy of the points
being made by all sides and serves to truncate the range of alternatives that
are considered. Although this Article takes a more skeptical view on what
property law can and cannot accomplish in its current form, it also builds
upon the foundation laid by both conservative and progressive scholars.
For many good reasons, economic analysis plays a significant role in
property scholarship,4 and the same can be said for efforts to show that
property law can, and has, accommodated societal values that are not and
should not be reducible to economic values.5 More importantly, scholars
who are generally concerned about the same thing—how property law can
best serve society today—can reach very different conclusions. Though
there is disagreement about whether the focus should be on ends or means,6
progressives and conservatives alike care that property rules serve valuable
functions in society, including the pursuit of distributive justice.7 Stated
differently, progressives do not have a monopoly on thinking that property
should serve human values.8 Although progressive scholars have taken on
4
See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, The Law and Economics Approach to Property, 3 PROP. L. REV. 212
(2014).
5
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 743, 743–44 (2009).
6
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 1718–20.
7
Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom Merrill, 3
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 65 (2014); see also Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of
Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 300 (1998) (observing that proponents of strong property rights and
those who argue that property rights reflect human values both believe their version of property
“structure[s] social relations in the best way possible”).
8
See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values.”).
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the mantle of a socially minded understanding of property, the idea that
property law should be a certain way because it is best for society also lies
at the heart of efficiency-based arguments. But the property distribution
crisis of the New Gilded Age and the related academic questions
surrounding the nature of property are at risk of only being partially
addressed. Both the conservative bias in favor of the status quo and the
progressive view that the tools necessary can be found in existing doctrine
are inward looking and as such are unlikely to greatly upset settled notions.
The conservative view is nostalgic and divorced from the challenges
development and inequality create for property.10 The progressive view, in
contrast, is optimistic about the possibility of property law being
transformed from within and believes in incorporating social values into an
institution designed to resist change.11 But conservative and progressive
views alike prioritize the extent to which their solutions or responses map
onto established doctrine, and though their conclusions differ, the goal is
the same: strengthening property law.12 As a result, only those alternatives
that do not break too far from past practices or that build upon past
practices are considered. Missing is the possibility that past understandings
of property law—especially as they provide security for some while
denying it for many others—may be inadequate for the current task. The
way that property operates today requires that we “consider the possibility
of fundamental challenges to the very foundations of the existing property
regime.”13 Across political lines there is growing awareness that society is
being adversely impacted by the rise in inequality and the related fortyyear stagnation in the well-being of most working Americans.14 Property
law is a crucial site of conflict about how to respond and, as comforting as
it is to either cling to (a negative take on the conservative position) or rely
upon (a negative take on the progressive position) existing rules,
responding to the challenge presented by the emerging oligarchy may
9
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
10
See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, City Replanning 61 (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477125.
11
Baron, supra note 2, at 957–62.
12
See Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 641,
644 (2013) (noting the “strong descriptive component” of perspectives on property).
13
A J VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 14 (2009).
14
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 3 (2012) (“Members of America’s middle class have felt that they were
long-suffering, and they were right. For three decades before the crisis, their incomes had barely
budged. Indeed, the income of a typical full-time male worker has stagnated for well over a third of a
century.”); STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., HOW INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY IS
DAMPENING U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO CHANGE THE TIDE 3 (2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/forum/Forum_2014/Income_Inequality.pdf [http://perma.cc/
922V-X2ZH] (“[I]nequality in the U.S. is dampening GDP growth . . . .”).
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require weakening, not strengthening, property law.
Property protections can be weakened in different ways, but, broadly
speaking, destabilization involves either selective use of existing law or,
where existing law does not provide sufficient leverage, pragmatic
resistance to exclusionary elements of property law. As a mechanism to
undermine false stratifications, structural inequality, and exclusion,
destabilization can be used as a lever to promote more sustainable and
inclusive forms of property law and economic growth. Destabilization can
be meaningful in and of itself; in other words, in some circumstances,
weakening the expectations of property owners is the end goal. For
example, when black college students protested segregated lunch counters
by staging a sit-in at the Greensboro, North Carolina Woolworth’s, their
goal was to force the store to become more inclusive, despite there being
settled property expectations that owners had the right to exclude on the
basis of race.16 But destabilization can also find its meaning through
politics, lessening or threatening to lessen property protections because of
the instrumental value in doing so. When workers engage in sit-down
strikes, the property rights of factory owners are diminished relative to a
default, exclusion-based understanding of those rights.17 The goal of the
union usually is not to occupy the factory, but instead is to improve
working conditions, especially worker pay. This lesson can be applied
more broadly in that there can be political value in undermining or
threatening to undermine the property rights of owners, even if the goal is
not necessarily to take away those rights or to redistribute property.
Weakening property protections—even where there is recognized value in
exclusionary rights—can make it difficult on a personal and political level
for those who benefit from the property system to be indifferent to the
needs of those excluded from such benefits.
For those who rely on property or hope to join the propertied class, the
15
Put differently, it may require taking cues from housing activists and “challenging local
property entitlements.” Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing 21
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497695.
For more on the emerging oligarchy in a rare example of an academic study that “went viral,” see
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and
Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576–77 (2014) (concluding that American democracy is
threatened because a small number of affluent Americans dominate policymaking, even when the
majority of citizens disagree with them); see also John Cassidy, Is America an Oligarchy?, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 18, 2014) http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/is-america-an-oligarchy
[http://perma.cc/8A7C-PQZM] (discussing the Gilens and Page study); Lucille A. Jewel, Merit and
Mobility: A Progressive View of Class, Culture, and the Law, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 239, 244 (2012)
(discussing the possibility “that the structure of American society is trending toward oligarchy”).
16
EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS,
PIRATES, AND PROTESTORS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 1–3 (2010).
17
See Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial
Relations, 1935–1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45 (2006) (giving a history of sit-down strikes).
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notion that property can function largely as a protector of the status quo is
troublesome. But for those excluded, often at birth, from sharing in most of
the benefits of the strong expectation that property will, and should, be
protected, destabilizing property is much less threatening. By leveraging
points of conflict or tension already built into institutions that protect
private property, communities can undermine structures that reinforce false
stratifications. Even where there are advantages to the current rules, by
credibly threatening to unsettle expectations and the status quo, excluded
communities or individuals increase their ability to claim compensating
payments for the harms associated with those rules. The point of
destabilizing property is not, in every instance, to replace the structure or
the rules, but to advance the interests of the excluded by questioning the
existing rules and changing or threatening to change them where their
benefits are inequitably shared. While it may be impossible to reconcile the
positions of those with property and those without, where the law serves to
limit the enjoyment of property to the fortunate few at the expense of the
excluded, it should be subject to an ongoing effort to find better
institutional arrangements.
This Article begins, in Part II, by exploring information cost
explanations of property rules. Over a long series of articles, Professors
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have advanced an understanding of
property law that emphasizes information cost advantages to owners and to
the public of the exclusionary rule.18 An equally extensive literature has
developed that critiques their theory as a truncated version of property law
that fails to take into account all of the limitations on the right to exclude
and that overlooks non-economic rationales behind different doctrines.19
Because there is such a well-developed literature responding to the
information cost model, Part II concentrates on elements of Merrill and
Smith’s model that have received less attention; namely, their attack on the
bundle of rights conception of property rights and what I argue is their
status quo bias. Information cost theory should not be understood as
synonymous either with conservative or with law and economics
scholarship. Conservative property scholarship is not always grounded in
law and economics.20 Similarly, while there are conservative law and
economics scholars, there are also scholars who employ law and

18
The choice to focus on Merrill and Smith is not random. See John A. Lovett, Progressive
Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 746 (2010) (“Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith’s versions of this exclusion oriented view of property are the most vital and
influential.”).
19
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 222 (8th ed. 2014) (collecting several sources and
summarizing their various critiques of the view held by Merrill and Smith).
20
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and
Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379 (2010).

2015]

DESTABILIZING PROPERTY

405
21

economics approaches in support of progressive goals. Part II focuses on
information cost theory because it is perhaps the most important branch of
conservative law and economics property theory today and is a great
example of scholarship that works for property.
Part III explores the ways that progressive scholars seek to improve
property law by extending property protections to vulnerable or excluded
people. One of the most important contributions of progressive property
scholars has been to show that people may gain property rights through
extended use even where they lack formal rights. Part III explores these
contributions and the related tendency among progressives to work with,
rather than against, property. It draws upon Charles Reich’s The New
Property22 and Joseph Singer’s The Reliance Interest in Property23 because
of the importance of these articles in progressive theory. The progressive
inclination to work with property is then illustrated by exploring David
Super’s use of property concepts to respond to the rise in economic
inequality in his article, A New New Property.24
The underlying question of how property law scholars have or should
respond to a class society in which many people have little to no access to
property is addressed in Part IV. Although it risks sounding hyperbolic,
these are, or should be, trying times for the country’s economic system and
for its support mechanisms, including property law. Inequality measures
and poverty rates are at or near historic highs;25 the American Dream
seems quite remote for a whole generation who are graduating into the
Great Recession, facing un- and under-employment; and there is growing
awareness of the country’s relative lack of economic mobility.26
Progressives and conservatives alike are recognizing the way that the
ladder between classes seems to be broken and the place of individuals is
predictively defined not by merit or effort, but by the lottery of birth.27
Property scholars concerned about the growing gap between what
property law looks like in theory and how it operates in practice in light of
poverty and inequality tend to gravitate towards one of two paths. The first
21

See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006).
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
23
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
24
David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773 (2013).
25
See infra notes 406–12 and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 265 (“America is no longer the land of opportunity.”);
Priya S. Gupta, The American Dream, Deferred: Contextualing Property After the Foreclosure Crisis,
73 MD. L. REV. 523, 523 (2014) (“In a few short years, the American Dream has dried up like a raisin
in the sun.”); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Why Housing?, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 5, 21
(2013) (“Our current upheaval is so great that contemporary accounts refer to it as the end of the
American Dream.”).
27
See Jason DeParle, Harder for Americans to Rise from Lower Rungs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/harder-for-americans-to-rise-from-lower-rungs.html
(reporting on bipartisan concern about America’s relatively low level of economic mobility).
22
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path is to focus on doctrine. From this perspective, the scholarly role is to
show the myriad ways that property law already provides mechanisms for
a better, more inclusive society. Doctrine provides the moorings, but
property doctrine is sufficiently elastic and comes in enough forms that one
can build a hopeful vision.28 That these doctrine-based possibilities might
be mere ripples in the larger ocean of law that protects the status quo is
glossed over. The doctrinal perspective defines property narrowly—as a
discrete field of study and not something that should be understood as
highly contextual—and can only shrug, disclaiming responsibility, when
alternatives that might have provided the foundation for a more inclusive
society are neglected.
The second path is to double-down on property. According to this
perspective, the problem is not too much but too little property. Unlike the
doctrinal path, here, property and property law are understood expansively.
Whole areas of law and human experience can be understood in terms of
property law and the path forward is to ensure the benefits of property are
shared by the poor and the formerly excluded. An inclusive version of
property law from this perspective serves as a form of salvation, expanding
what counts as property and how people can claim a property interest, all
the while reaffirming the edifice of property law. By doubling-down on
property, scholars from Charles Reich forward have embraced property
even as they emphasize the need to share the benefits of property more
widely.29 The problem with doubling down is that it requires a perhaps
unwarranted optimism or faith that those seeking a more inclusive version
of property law will end up with the best hand and not those who seek a
continuation of the status quo.
A third path, albeit one largely ignored, is for those concerned about
the relationship between property law and the linked problems of
inequality and poverty to seek to undermine, not support, property.
According to this perspective, there is a need for an alternative to the two
dominant reactionary modes, both of which buy into the potential of
property. The call for creative use of existing doctrine and the call for the
needs of the poor to be covered in property’s protective blanket both move
in the right direction, but they are unlikely to result in meaningful change
unless they are coupled with credible threats to the status quo. Moving
from what is to what is possible requires an appreciation of the challenges
associated with the New Gilded Age. Existing institutions, including forms
of distributing and protecting property, must be continually questioned. In
28
For one version of such a hopeful vision, see JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY:
FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010).
29
See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 39 (1990) (explaining an inclusionary approach to property that would
provide each person with a right to shelter and sustenance).
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order to enable positive change, the tremendous security enjoyed by those
who benefit disproportionately from the existing exclusionary rules and
property rights regime must be diminished or threatened. The problems of
inequality and poverty, especially as they relate to the acquisition and
distribution of property, demand that we explore a third path, one that
adopts a critical and skeptical stance towards property protections.
II. THE INFORMATION COST REFRAIN
A standard starting point for progressive writing on property law over
the last decade has become an overview of and attack on information cost
theory. Indeed, that this is so common among progressives raises the
question of whether such critiques are based on the strengths of
information cost theory or because the theory is such a convenient foil. In a
series of path-breaking articles, Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith argued that the advantages of property law are best understood in
terms of enforced simplicity.30 In particular, the centrality of the
exclusionary rule and limits on the forms property can take generate
tremendous information cost advantages to society, primarily because they
simplify information demands upon third parties.31 Unlike contract law
where parties can negotiate individualized sets of rights and obligations,
property law limits the acceptable types of property in ways that are readily
understood by third parties. Moreover, the exclusionary rule, which Merrill
and Smith argue lies at, or near,32 the heart of property law, makes it
relatively easy to enforce and understand property rights while providing
owners latitude to use their property effectively. The information cost
theory acts as a lightning rod for progressive responses.33 It is attacked for
giving an overly economic explanation to property law and for ignoring
30
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1849, 1850–51 (2007) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The Morality of Property] (suggesting that
property rights are rooted in simple morality); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface] (describing property law as a fixed system of mutually accepted rules);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization]
(explaining that property law is a relatively limited field, constrained by strict standardizations);
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 733 (1998) [hereinafter
Merrill, Right to Exclude] (explaining that property law contains particular rights that are dependent
upon an institutional authority to create and enforce them).
31
For a good summary of information-cost theory, see Jerediah Purdy, Some Pluralism About
Pluralism: A Comment on Hanoch Dagan’s “Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law,” 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 9, 11–15 (2013), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/02/9_Purdy.pdf [http://perma.cc/JCA4-X3TP].
32
See Henry E. Smith, The Thing about Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 95,
96 (2014) (asserting that the right to exclude is central, if not the linchpin, in property law).
33
See, e.g., id. at 95.
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exceptions that undermine the claimed simplicity of the system.34 These
responses have not stopped Merrill and Smith, both prolific scholars, from
repeating the main idea of their theory in article after article, for over a
decade and a half in somewhat of a refrain.35
An extensive literature explores information cost theory’s strengths
and weaknesses. Merrill and Smith’s insightful work on the numerus
clausus principle captured an important and under-appreciated aspect of
property law; namely, that in contrast with contract law, property comes in
a standard and closed set of forms. Their work helped establish that the
numerus clausus principle applies under the common law as a matter of
practice just as it exists explicitly in the civil law.36 For scholars who have
internalized Hohfeld’s bundle of rights concept,37 the idea that property
law only allows some bundle forms and not others is eye-opening.
Similarly, Merrill and Smith, separately and as co-authors, showed the
importance, and for them the singular importance, of the right to exclude.38
In their treatment of the exclusionary rule, Merrill and Smith make a fairly
strong case that not all sticks are created equally—some rights lie more at
the core of what is property than other rights. Exclusion operates as a
widely understood bright line rule that is so important that Merrill and
Smith equate it with “classic property rights.”39 The connection between
their numerus clausus and exclusionary rule work can be found in the
information cost explanation they give for the bounded and simple nature
of property rules. And it is in their explanation, arguably, that they move
from description to theory.
Merrill and Smith argue that property law is simple—it has a limited
number of allowable forms and is based on the easily understood
exclusionary rule—because simplicity minimizes the information costs to
34
See Meredith M. Render, Complexity in Property, 81 TENN. L. REV. 79, 98–118 (2013)
(presenting a catalogue of many of these critiques).
35
Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2009).
36
Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 30.
37
For the articles in which Hohfeld developed the concept, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917)
[hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 1917]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); see also
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 544–46
(2005) (giving a quick intellectual history of the bundle concept); Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not Just
a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH 279, 279–81 (2011), http://econjwatch.org/articles/property-isnot-just-a-bundle-of-rights [http://perma.cc/8S46-SKD9] (same).
38
See, e.g., Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 30, at 730 (“[T]he right to exclude others is
more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”); see also
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE
L.J. 357, 360 (2001) (explaining that property rights have historically been in rem because of our right
to exclude); Smith, supra note 37, at 281 (describing the right to exclude as “how property works”
(emphasis in original)).
39
Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 30, at 792.
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third parties. Contract law is concerned with the rights between two
parties, which means that through contract, parties can create rights and
obligations that are both complex and nuanced. In contrast, the in rem
nature of property law—the fact that property law defines rights a person
has against the whole world—means that property law needs to economize
on concepts and complexity. By their very nature, many items of property
are distinct: one plot of land may be different from other plots of land in
terms of everything from its physical dimensions and existing uses to the
minerals found under the surface and its location relative to services.40 But
if every item or plot of land was subject to individually distinct legal
characteristics as well, the information costs borne by third parties and
society could be tremendous. Complexity, Merrill and Smith argue, would
frustrate the exchange of property and the functioning of markets. In small
societies—Merrill and Smith use the example of Robinson Crusoe—rights
can be kept in personam; but in larger societies, contract rights are
unwieldy and in rem property rights are required.41 By reducing the set of
allowable forms for holding property (numerus clausus) and by using a
simple boundary rule to establish the rights between owners and nonowners (exclusion), property law reduces information costs.
While I have provided only a thumbnail sketch of information cost
theory, the centrality of efficiency-based reasoning to Merrill and Smith’s
understanding of property comes across even in this quick overview.
Whether looking at real property or intellectual property, Merrill and Smith
use their information cost theory to explain why some rights are protected
by a bounded set of simple exclusionary rules and others by more complex
and more information-dependent governance rules.42 Although they should
not be faulted for their conviction and belief in their own thesis,
information cost theory claims to be more than just another way of looking
at property law but as the way it should be understood. The idea that there
are information cost advantages to simple rules is undoubtedly true and by
itself not that controversial. Merrill and Smith’s repeated insistence that
property law should be guided by this single efficiency-based goal,
however, invites critique.
Most of the criticism of information cost theory centers on the fact that
property law does more than just enhance efficiency. Non-economic value
40
See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 828–29 (2009) (discussing
the complexity of different parcels of land and how each property is unique because of this).
41
Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 30, at 793 (“The unique
advantage of in rem rights—the strategy of exclusion—is that they conserve on information costs
relative to in personam rights in situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is
large, and the resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost.”).
42
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
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judgments also shape property law rules. As multiple scholars
convincingly show, politics cannot be excised from our understanding of
property law simply because aspects of the existing system are arguably
efficient.43 The form and content of rules reflect political choices and
property law cannot avoid politics simply by resorting to an efficiency
approach, for that too is a choice. Understanding property rules as being
based on societal choices rather than deriving somehow, in an inevitable
fashion, from economic theory creates space for critical scholarship with
alternative normative perspectives. Into this space, progressive property
scholars Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, and Joseph Singer, for
example, advocate, respectively, for property law to be grounded on social
obligations, value ethics, and democracy-enhancing concerns.44 A broader
strain of reactionary scholarship takes aim at law and economics
approaches in property law in general, with the information cost theory
simply being the most prominent of the targets.45
A related critique of information cost theory is that it offers a falsely
simplified vision of property law. Merrill and Smith’s theory depends on
property rules being standardized and easily understood because the
information cost advantages disappear if they are not. If property law is
complicated, to make sense of property rights third parties have to know
too much and property rights cannot be easily protected or transferred.
Merrill and Smith deal with this challenge by focusing on the rules alone,
ignoring or treating dismissively exceptions to the rules that undermine the
simplicity of the system.46 Critics of information cost theory run in the
opposite direction, arguing that rules and their exceptions cannot be
cleanly separated—that to understand the rules, you have to know and
understand the exceptions.47 Additionally, given that information cost
theory is in part based on the idea that exclusion lies at the heart of what it
means for something to be property (or at least that it is very important),
responses, not surprisingly, tend to be skeptical about the singular
importance of exclusion.48 By showing the complex nature of property
43
See, e.g., Dagan, The Craft of Property, supra note 1, at 1558–65; Nestor M. Davidson,
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008); Avihay Dorfman,
Private Ownership and the Standing to Say So, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 402 (2014).
44
Alexander, supra note 9; Peñalver, supra note 40; Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates:
Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009); see also Ezra
Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107
(2013) (presenting an overview of progressive property arguments).
45
See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847 (2013); Eric T.
Freyfogle, Private Land Made (Too) Simple, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10155 (2003); Peñalver, supra note 40.
46
See, e.g., Singer, supra note 44, at 1025–26 (arguing that our current estates system is one
example of Merrill and Smith oversimplifying property rights).
47
See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1428–29 (2013); Singer, supra note 44, at 1026–27.
48
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 35, at 1064.
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even in light of the numerus clausus principle and the exclusionary rule—
consider, for example, the multiple overlapping property rights that parties
can have in a single parcel by dividing the property into use rights such as
easements and equitable servitudes or into time segments such as life
estates and reversionary interests—critics challenge Merrill and Smith’s
reductionist presentation of property law.49
Moving away from the core elements of information cost theory and
the vast literature it has spawned in response, I turn now to Merrill and
Smith’s more recent works. Although somewhat at the periphery of
information cost theory, the recent attacks by Merrill and Smith on the
bundle of rights conception of property and on legal realism flow naturally
from the larger argument and indeed can be found throughout their
scholarship.50 In place of the bundle of sticks, Smith offers up an
alternative modular theory of property.51 For his part, Merrill first suggests
property is similar to a prism,52 and then argues for a narrow understanding
of what he calls the property strategy.53 I believe the works of both
scholars shed light on the malleability of property institutions, but also
overstate the danger that the bundle of rights poses to traditional property
rights. More importantly for my purposes, a defensive bias in favor of the
status quo can be seen in their efforts to depose the legal realist bundle-ofsticks conception of property and replace it with less dynamic, more fixed
versions of property.

49
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, Property, Contract and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S374 (2002); see
also Dagan, supra note 1, at 1565–70 (examining Hansmann and Kraakman’s critique of Merrill and
Smith); Davidson, supra note 43, at 1599–600 (seeking to add “structure and content” to the
standardization of numerus clausus); Render, supra note 34, at 108–10 (observing the two main
challenges to Merrill and Smith’s claim that information costs are not actually reduced with numerus
clausus, and that it does not restrict the enforcement of property interests); Anna di Robilant, Property
and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in
Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 394–402 (2014) (examining Merrill and Smith’s reductionist
approach in a larger discussion on numerus clausus and “deliberative democracy”).
50
Though I focus on their most recent attacks in this Article, Merrill and Smith have been
attacking the bundle for some time. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean
Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S77–78 (2011) (“In his seminal writings, Coase
assumes a picture of property as ad hoc bundles of government-prescribed use rights. This assumption
is deeply misleading in critical respects and is out of sync with both classical and much contemporary
economic thought.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 38, at 357–58 (2001) (stating that property is more
than simply distribution of “things”).
51
Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012)
[hereinafter Smith, The Economy of Concepts]; Smith, supra note 1.
52
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH 247 (2011), http://econjwatch.org/
articles/the-property-prism [http://perma.cc/Y8V3-4GT6].
53
Thomas Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012).
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A. Living in Legoland
Legos are great. Who can object to a legal theory built around Legos?
In two recent articles, Property as the Law of Things and On the Economy
of Concepts in Property, Professor Henry Smith analogizes his theory of
property to the connections made possible by the popular childhood toy.54
Rejecting the bundle-of-sticks understanding of property, Smith develops
what he calls a “modular theory of property.”55 But the part of my
childhood that the articles most reminded me of was not playing with
Legos but playing a board game called “Rail Baron.” Following Smith’s
lead in using toy metaphors, let me first explain Rail Baron. The goal of
the game is simple: make money faster than your opponents can make
money. You do this by buying railroads and traveling between cities based
on the roll of the dice. Think hardcore Monopoly. Luck plays a role
(excuse the pun), but in order to win you need to convince the other
players that you are losing so that when they have to ride on someone
else’s railroad, they choose your line and not the line of an opponent. My
father was amazing at convincing everyone else that he was losing, even
when all the evidence should have told us that he was winning. Similarly,
Smith describes himself as the underdog,56 even though he and others who
share his perspective on property are winning. Put differently, property law
in the United States is amazingly stable, and therefore, the status quo does
not need defending.
Smith’s argument in both articles is fairly abstract and, with a few
oblique exceptions contained in the footnotes, avoids singling out
particular scholars for attack. But the underlying message is clear:
information cost theories have more explanatory power than the theories
offered up under the bundle-of-sticks/progressive property perspective. It
is a point Smith echoes in a third article, a brief piece aptly titled, Property
Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights.57 Opposite Smith are progressive scholars
who are more inclined to accept the legal realist bundle-of-rights metaphor
and to embrace progressive context based decision-making.58 Although
still marshaling troops and harder to pin down in part because of an
express embrace of pluralism, the progressive bundle-of-rights camp
includes a who’s who of leading property professors.59 The Law of Things
attacks these scholars by launching a trial balloon for the modular theory of
54

Smith, supra note 1, at 1708; Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2119.
Smith, supra note 1, at 1695.
56
Infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
57
Smith, supra note 37.
58
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1716 (describing ways in which the opposing camp believes sticks
can be detached from the bundle, customized, and interact with one another).
59
A partial list of active participants would include professors Gregory Alexander, Hanoch
Dagan, John Lovett, Eduardo Peñalver, Jedediah Purdy, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler.
55
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property. Layering on additional support grounded in a theory of
linguistics and the mind, The Economy of Concepts furthers the argument
that property is marked by simplicity of design and rules. Judging by the
responses that have already been published, the modular theory has either
already been shot down, or is at least on life support. The irony, of course,
is that the respondents to date could not have been better selected to agree
with the article. Smith’s frequent co-author, Merrill, spends the bulk of
Property as Modularity highlighting points of agreement and the strengths
he sees in Smith’s modular theory.60 Similarly, Professor Eric Claeys,
although he launches into his critiques more quickly, begins by writing that
Smith and Merrill’s series of articles developing the information and
exclusion centered approach to property “have been more original and
influential in American property scholarship than has work by anyone else
in his and my cohort”61 and noting his general agreement with Smith on
“how private property should be structured in practice.”62 But by the end of
both responses, I imagine Smith thinking to himself, “with friends like
these . . . .”63
Smith’s most obvious contribution in these three articles is his
argument that the bundle-of-rights understanding, by treating the sticks in
the bundle in an isolated and easily disaggregated fashion, does a poor job
describing property law.64 Merrill’s view is that the modular theory
provides a better snapshot of property but is still incomplete because it fails
to explain the incentivizing effects of property.65 Both The Law of Things
and The Economy of Concepts take property law as it is and offer modular
theory as a better description of what it is. As Claeys points out, such a
descriptive theory does not address the more important question: is what is
what should be?66 To return to Legoland, when you look around at how
property works in the United States, it is possible to see all sorts of good
60
Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151 (2012),
http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol125_merrill.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4KY
-NMEG].
61
Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of
Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 133 (2012), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/
pdfs/forvol125_claeys.pdf [http://perma.cc/6RXA-8EHE].
62
Id. at 134.
63
Many of my friends probably had similar thoughts after I published my critique of progressive
property. See Rosser, supra note 44, at 108 (“The goal of this Essay is to pick a fight with progressive
property scholars.”).
64
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 37, at 286 (“In a bundle of sticks the sticks do not interact; you can
add or subtract them at will, and still you will have a bundle with roughly the same properties. Not so
with property.”). This is an argument that Smith and Merrill have made before. See Merrill & Smith,
The Morality of Property, supra note 30, 1867–68 (suggesting that the bundle-of-sticks theory is
misleading in property law and critiquing various academics who have recently written in support of
it).
65
Merrill, supra note 60, at 159–63.
66
Claeys, supra note 61, at 139–40.
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things. As Smith and Merrill have pointed out numerous times, limits on
the forms of property, a principle embodied in numerus clausus, serve
important informational values. Standardization lowers transaction costs,
enhancing alienability and the settlement of disputes.67 The “blocks”
(modules) of limited property types work well with exclusionary “blocks”
to provide owners with security, a degree of liberty, and the incentive to
create or capture ownership gains.68 Because of these advantages,
information theorists such as Smith and Merrill “value stability over
change,” Professor Jane Baron observes, in contrast with progressive
scholars who “are far more receptive to change.”69 Smith acknowledges as
much in The Law of Things, arguing in support of “traditional baselines
that, while in need of constant improvement, are very worthy of
explanation and a good deal of respect.”70
If proposing an alternative to the bundle is the most obvious
contribution, there is as much to be gleaned from Smith’s natural
inclination to respect traditional baseline rules. After all, Smith is hardly
the first scholar to attack the bundle-of-rights metaphor.71 Similarly, it is
not as if progressive property scholars do not acknowledge the importance
of the right to exclude; they simply deny its place as the sine qua non of
property.72 Smith seems to agree, explaining, “[t]here is no interest in
exclusion per se. Instead exclusion strategies, including the right to
exclude, serve the interest in use.”73 But his agreement only goes so far:
Smith claims that “[t]he exclusion strategy is the starting point in
property.”74 Claeys faults The Law of Things for not focusing more on
use,75 joining a number of property scholars who have prioritized use rights
in recent articles.76 But such a critique, like the critique that descriptions of

67
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 30, at 14, 24–25 (using estates
law to show how standardization can promote alienability).
68
Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2115; Smith, supra note 37, at 281.
69
Baron, supra note 2, at 944–45 (emphasis in original).
70
Smith, supra note 1, at 1692.
71
See Baron, supra note 2, at 922 n.8 (collecting sources); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless
Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1373–74 n.24 (2011) (same).
72
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 35; see also Baron, supra note 2, at 919 n.4 (collecting
sources).
73
Smith, supra note 1, at 1693; see also Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2115
n.69; Smith, supra note 32, at 95.
74
Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2115; see also id. at 2123. Making a
relatively fine distinction, Smith argues first that “[a]t the core of [the] architecture [of property] is
exclusion because it is a default, a convenient starting point.” Smith, supra note 37, at 282. He then
goes on to argue, “[t]his does not mean that exclusion is the most important or ‘core’ value.” Id.
75
Claeys, supra note 61, at 143.
76
See generally Dyal-Chand, supra note 71; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property
Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008) (arguing that property theory should emphasize the idea of
exclusion as the owner’s use of an agenda-setting authority); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting
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property’s recurring structural or architectural features neglect the
dynamics internal to those features,77 is arguably a matter of emphasis. The
Law of Things and, especially, The Economy of Concepts operate at a high
level, providing a new way of conceiving the general features of property
that does have certain explanatory advantages over the straw man versions
of the bundle and legal realism Smith attacks.78 I am not convinced that the
modular theory will find traction among legal scholars, even though it may
be superior in some respects to the bundle-of-rights metaphor. But I am
convinced that modular theory reflects a level of comfort with the status
quo and an indifference to contextual concerns that I do not share.
Gregory Alexander argues that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”79
Indeed, part of the goal of Alexander’s article, The Social-Obligation Norm
in American Property Law, was to “offer an alternative” theory to the lawand-economics approach to property scholarship.80 As a professor, I find
Alexander’s position quite appealing. It offers the promise of validating
scholarly work. But is Alexander right? The gap between the two scholarly
camps seems less about theoretical disagreement than about emphasis and
appetite for change.81 This is not to say that there are not important
differences. There are. But differences in theory provide, at best, a partial
explanation of these important differences. Over the years, progressive
scholars have advanced a whole range of theories that push back against
exclusion-centric understandings of property.82 Influential works, such as
those discussed in Part III, Charles Reich’s The New Property, and Joseph
Singer’s The Reliance Interest in Property, offer, in their own way,
theories regarding the nature and characteristic of property that go beyond
the right to exclude.83 Yet, what Singer calls the “castle model of

the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003) (arguing for a revised understanding of
property theory that emphasizes a combination of acquisition, use, and disposal of property).
77
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1854–60
(2012); Davidson, supra note 43, at 1610–15.
78
As Michael Heller writes, “the overwhelming evidence suggests that the notion of an openended bundle of property rights is wrong.” Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163, 1192 (1999).
79
Gregory S. Alexander, Remarks at 2012 Law and Society Annual Meeting (June 8, 2012)
(notes on file with author); Email from Gregory S. Alexander to Ezra Rosser (Aug. 17, 2011 7:59 PM
EST) (on file with author).
80
Alexander, supra note 9, at 750.
81
In recent works, scholars in both camps have gone out of their way to acknowledge that the
distance between them is not as great as it might seem. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER &
EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 137, 205–07 (2012); Merrill,
supra note 53, at 2063, 2088–89; Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2128.
82
See, e.g., Rosser, supra note 44, at 116–23 (presenting Alexander’s social obligation theory,
Peñalver’s virtue theory, and Singer’s democratic model).
83
Reich, supra note 22; Singer, supra note 23.
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property” continues its hold on the general public and limits the
possibility of radical change.
For Smith, radical change is something to be avoided. The bundle
metaphor seems to welcome change, begging as it does questions such as
“what would happen if we took this stick out of the bundle or rearranged
property rights in this way?” Rejecting this invitation, The Law of Things
highlights “[t]he importance of explaining why structures are not otherwise
than they are.”85 The article continues by arguing that the features of
property “can be tweaked, but are not as detachable as the bundle view
would have it.”86 Traditional rules, Smith suggests, are generally good
rules that at most should be reformed, not ripped apart in ways suggested
by legal realists.87 The Economy of Concepts frames this reification of
traditional rules in terms of a defense of formalism.88 According to Smith,
“[t]he most useful notion of formalism . . . is relative indifference to
context.”89 Formal rules are subject to the critique that “they are not
responsive enough to societal needs,”90 but Smith deals with this critique
by arguing that it would be costly to move from formalism to contextbased law.91 Even changing isolated rules so that they better reflect
particular values is dangerous because the impact of such changes may be
felt by the larger structure and may threaten stability.92 If there is to be
more radical change, or what Smith terms “remodularization,” then such
changes should be “channeled to the legislatures.”93 Locating the authority
for substantive change in the legislative bodies reflects an appreciation for
democratic decision-making but also serves to narrow the field of changes
realistically on the table. Change is bad, according to Smith, because the
means employed by the existing system do a good job reducing transaction
and information costs. Smith explains that the bundle-of-rights theory of
property, by ignoring “delineation cost,” makes it “deceptively attractive to
move in the direction of more governance style contextualized inquiry.”94
Of course, that is an essential question: whether the gains of moving
from a starting assumption of respect for traditional rules to an approach
84
Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments,
and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314–22 (2006); see also di Robilant, supra note
49, at 403–06; Gupta, supra note 26, at 530–32.
85
Smith, supra note 1, at 1699.
86
Id. at 1700.
87
Id. at 1714.
88
Smith elsewhere notes that “[u]nreflective conceptualism or formalism is a nonstarter,” but then
advocates in a form of what might be called reflective formalism. Smith, supra note 37, at 281.
89
Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2105.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 2127.
92
Smith, supra note 1, at 1719.
93
Id. at 1724.
94
Id. at 1717.
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more open to contextualized inquiry will exceed the costs of such a
move.95 And it is that question, not theory, per se, that I believe best
explains many of the debates currently animating property scholarship.
Even though Smith attacks declarations by fiat that defend ad hocery,96 the
same criticism can be leveled against the assumption that “[p]romoting the
promiscuous employment of contextual information in property” amounts
to ignoring the information cost of moving away from traditional rules.97
Moving away from traditional rules will impose costs, but those costs are
likely to not be distributed evenly. Instead, such costs are likely to be borne
by those who have traditionally benefitted or stand to benefit from such
rules. Maintaining the status quo, however, also imposes costs, primarily
on those required to honor the property rights of others even though they
enjoy far less benefit from the existing structure. The assumption that the
costs of change will exceed the benefits is just that, an assumption.98
Fortunately for information theorists, this assumption is widely shared.
Although lawyers observe many ways in which property must
accommodate the interests of neighbors, of non-owners, and of society,
public understanding of property is more in line with Blackstone’s “sole
and despotic dominion.”99 And though even information theorists will
acknowledge that property is more complex than that, caveats aside, their
emphasis on the centrality of exclusion is not far removed from the castle
model.100 Put differently, if we consider the debate as more than an
academic exercise and instead an attempt to influence public debate and
understanding of property, information theorists have a huge advantage. As
Smith highlights in The Economy of Concepts, simple theories that
“capture known facts in a shorter description” are attractive, in part
because they are generalizable.101 Moreover, the status quo and existing
95
To return to information cost theory, excessive focus on limited forms of property might
impose costs that exceed the transaction cost reduction benefits. See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of
Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (2013); see also Pierre Schlag, Coase Minus the
Coase Theorem—Some Problems with Chicago Transaction Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 212
(2013) (highlighting the need for law and economics’ scholars to “provide . . . some theoretically
cogent criterion capable of application to serve as the conceptual pivot for deciding when to economize
on the cost in question by tweaking the legal regime and when to instead leave the market and the firms
to adjust on their own”).
96
Smith, supra note 1, at 1720 n.112.
97
Id. at 1717; Smith, supra note 37, at 283.
98
ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 81, at 137–43.
99
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile ed. 1979)
(1765–69). For an excellent related discussion, see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or,
Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998).
100
Compare Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 971–74 (2009), with Alexander, supra note 35, at
1066 (arguing that common sense morality extends further than Smith envisions).
101
Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2107; see also Smith, supra note 37, at
282.
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distributions of property have tremendous pull on people. The possibility
of change-induced loss generally outweighs the possibility of offsetting
gains in all but rare moments of crisis.102 Behavioral economists might
explain a status quo bias in terms of risk aversion or the endowment
effect,103 but for whatever reason, the demand for meaningful change in
property law is generally muted.104 But reading The Law of Things and The
Economy of Concepts makes it seem as if the status quo—finding form
here as a celebration of simple exclusionary rules—needs defending.
The odd part is that both camps seem to think that they are losing. A
Statement on Progressive Property, written by Alexander, Peñalver,
Singer, and Underkuffler, begins, “[t]he common conception of property as
protection of individual control over valuable resources is both intuitively
and legally powerful.”105 It continues with an explanation of why the
common conception is “inadequate.”106 Similarly, Smith bills the modular
theory as a “clear contrast with conventional property theories.”107
According to Smith, the idea that property law is the law of things “suffers
from a serious image problem.”108 Smith presents traditional rules in
general as under siege by legal realists and post-realists. Smith complains,
“The burden is shifted to anyone who wants to deny the relevance of
context, and when using context can be shown to be congruent with a
virtuous purpose, objections are labeled as formalistic or worse.”109 As in
Rail Baron, both progressives and conservatives seem to be attempting to
claim that they are losing. In one sense they both may be right: information
theorists arguably have the support of the masses (and they know it110),
while progressive property scholars are likely to find their theories better
received at most academic conferences. But in the larger sense, my team
(to admit the obvious) is losing. Change in property law is slow and, given
public sentiment, information theorists command the high ground.
But instead of admitting defeat or pleading for mercy, I want to
102
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the
Housing Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 131 (2012). The importance of crisis to inspire
political change is perhaps best exemplified by the Great Depression and President Roosevelt’s
progressive, experimental responses. See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, What the New Deal Did, 124 POL.
SCI. Q. 251 (2009).
103
See Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
93, 115–16 (2011) (summarizing risk aversion and endowment effect studies).
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See generally Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453,
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question the value of continuing to rationalize and justify the status quo.
Even though Smith claims that “the architectural view raises the
overlooked question of why things could not be otherwise,”111 my
impression is that it does an admirable job explaining why things are the
way they are but does very little to disprove the possibility of change for
the better. Why could things not be otherwise? For Smith, the exclusionary
rule works because it leaves implicit “many of the protected privileges of
use.”112 By placing such significant weight on the value of simplicity,
Smith fails to consider the costs of “shortcut[s]” to non-owners of a static
system that keeps property rights implicit and uncovered.113 In his response
to modular theory, Claeys criticizes economic-based legal scholarship for
having a purely instrumentalist view of normative categories and for
“bootstrapping” on existing doctrine.114 I would take this critique a step
further and argue that economic rationalizing theories confuse descriptions
of the way the world is and the predictive value of models for normative
value.115 The fact that we have a certain set of building blocks, or modules,
does not mean that other blocks would not work or that the arrangement of
the existing blocks is necessarily best. Smith’s effort to read out the
exceptions and to construct a simplistic model of property116 ends up
reading as an attempt to justify the status quo and to praise the system. It is
fun to think about things in terms of Legos, but the real world and the law
of property are much more complex. The modular theory provides a novel
and interesting way of thinking about and describing the importance of
“things” in property and the law as it exists. But Smith’s concern that the
bundle of rights “downplays the cost of innovation” is overly speculative
in light of existing problems in the architecture of property and
distribution.117 The status quo is fully capable of defending itself and the
problems of property and distribution need proposals for improvement and
not further elaboration on how great the rules work together.
B. A Narrow Vision
Thomas Merrill’s recent scholarship offers an alternative to the
modular analogy as part of an attack on the bundle of rights that stands as
both an ode and an elegy to property. Merrill sings property’s praises,
111
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doing so in a way that attempts to reduce property from a system with
different goals and modes of governance to a more narrow understanding
of what Merrill labels the “property strategy.”118 He also argues that the
bundle should be replaced by a prism, the advantage of which is that a
prism metaphor highlights the importance of one’s perspective when
considering property.119 Merrill’s reductionist project boils away the role of
governance, equity, and even the state, leaving a condensed, more pure,
version of property. His purpose seems to be to draw a smaller circle
around what counts as “property.” In contrast to more holistic
understandings of property that prioritize the role of the state and recognize
that property is regulated in many different and sometimes conflicting
ways, Merrill offers a narrow vision of property’s “elemental features.”120
Although Merrill’s emphasis is on what makes the property strategy work
and how it operates in various settings, his closing acknowledgment of the
disadvantages of the property strategy is fairly damning to his larger
reductionist project. The disadvantages are significant enough that they
convert what was intended to be a celebration of simple property rules into
an elegy.
Framed as a descriptive argument, Merrill argues that the property
strategy is used by all human societies and consists of a limited set of
characteristics. Merrill notes that “[p]roperty law is highly complex, and all
of its details cannot be reduced to the elemental features of the property
strategy,” but he goes on to argue that the best way to understand property
is to “consider what makes property work in its most elemental
applications.”121 For those familiar with his prior work, Merrill’s answer to
“what makes property work” is not exactly new,122 though it is introduced
in a surprising way. In order to deflect the attacks on exclusion-centered
approaches to property, Merrill adopts a conciliatory tone, writing,
“[r]ather than joust over whether exclusion entails other attributes, or
whether it is or is not compatible with various qualifications, it is more
profitable to specify the central characteristics with greater precision.”123
While such language suggests a move away from the scholarly debates of
the past decade, readers are disabused of that idea in the very next
paragraph. Merrill asserts, “two prerogatives characterize ownership in all
of its manifestations . . . residual managerial authority . . . [and] residual
accessionary rights.”124 Merrill later acknowledges that resources can be
118
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subjected to a range of obligations and rights that do not fit neatly into
these two prerogatives, but claims that “[t]he property strategy requires
that the obligations imposed on the owner be sufficiently limited in number
and scope.”125 Picking up the lance once more, Merrill explains that
residual managerial authority and residual accessionary rights are but more
precise characterizations of the right to exclude.126
As an idea that is not tethered to the U.S. legal system, the property
strategy theory, although not based on natural law, is a simplified
proclamation about the nature of property itself, not about property as it is
found in any particular country. According to The Property Strategy,
property law differs across societies as a matter of degree but not in its
fundamental traits. Merrill argues that “the basic architecture of the
strategy—owner, object, residual authority, and accessionary rights—is the
same in all contexts and defines the property strategy relative to other
strategies for organizing the use of resources.”127 The examples that Merrill
chooses—a family farm, Native American tribes, and the household—
support the idea that there is a basic architecture, but do so with the
tendency, found in most efficiency-based models of the law, to overlook
counter-narratives. Thus, Merrill’s stylized family farm is just that, a
family farm, not a gigantic agribusiness defined by its corporate form. The
family farm’s accessionary gains or losses are residual for Merrill in that
they come after the farm has met its obligations, but they are not products
of state support such as infrastructure improvements and farm subsidies.
The same sort of reductionism informs Merrill’s treatment of Indian tribes.
By now it is well documented that, despite claims to the contrary by
outsiders, Indians historically employed what Merrill calls the property
strategy, albeit in ways that are often distinct from non-Indian expectations
regarding ownership.128 But by quickly establishing that Indians and other
indigenous peoples often have used rights to goods or land, any differences
across tribes are treated as irrelevant.129 Similarly, the household is treated
in a summary fashion that shows the property strategy at work but does not
bother to discuss complications to the general observation that property
rights are at work, even in the intimate setting of the household.130 Yet,
125
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property rights in the household have shifted dramatically over the last two
centuries and, in many respects, remain contested as society continues its
long move away from rigid patriarchy. In all three examples, the basic
architecture can be seen, in part because the description is kept basic and
does not show where similarities in regulating property break down or are
subject to constant change.
The takeaway lessons Merrill draws from his examples are surprising
and not entirely supported. As isolated observation points, Merrill’s three
examples do support the idea that “the property strategy is at work” in
many contexts where resources are subject to exclusionary control by an
individual.131 But he goes on to state that “neither the state, nor the right of
alienation is a necessary feature of the property strategy.”132 Merrill
acknowledges that many scholars see property as wholly a product of the
state, but Merrill argues that, because the property strategy can be observed
in informal settings and tribal societies without a modern (Western)
government, the state can be useful, but is not required. In discussing this
independent grounding for property law, Merrill’s view of the role of the
state is squarely laissez-faire. Property rights are good and the role of the
state is to support the property strategy and the authority of owners—
Merrill’s examples are permitting self-help and facilitating market
exchange.133 Tellingly, Merrill adds that “the state has a role in staying its
own hand from interfering with the prerogatives of owners.”134 Although
Merrill calls this government “forbearance,” it is also transparently a call
for a laissez-faire approach by the government, with an emphasis on
“protect[ing] the expectations of owners.”135
The problem with these takeaways—that the state is not required for
the property strategy and that forbearance should be emphasized—is that
they do not necessarily flow from the observation that a property strategy
can be observed in many contexts. A rich and nuanced description of
informal norms regarding property rights can make the state seem
unimportant, but the operation of informal control may depend on the
state’s background rules and protections.136 Put differently, the state’s role
may be hidden or seem to be of secondary importance in Shasta County,137
theory of the ownership of enterprise and transaction cost considerations to frame his inquiry into
powers of household owners).
131
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on a family farm, among Native Americans, or around the family dining
room, but that does not mean the state is unimportant or that the property
strategy exists independently of the state.138 Similarly, Merrill argues that
“the property strategy will be severely tested” by “bandit state[s that]
expropriate productive effort by citizens to enrich those who control the
state apparatus.”139 But this argument is based on the assumption that the
property strategy is good. Does progressive taxation of property owners in
favor of the propertyless amount to banditry? Or is the reverse true: can
calls for government forbearance by wealthy property owners and state
support of the property strategy amount to expropriation (of labor if not
property)? Without delving into context, into the details of each society, it
is impossible to know whether “threatening the security of property rights”
is a bad or good thing.140 Though Merrill’s language suggests an answer to
this question regardless of context, to take an extreme example, consider
slavery (secure property rights in another person). Or, less extreme but also
an example of a constructive threat to the security of property, consider
rigid forms of extreme social and wealth inequality coupled with limited
mobility and a frayed safety net.
Merrill’s presentation of the advantages and disadvantages of the
property strategy is quite insightful and compelling. He shows how the
property strategy: (1) is derived from local knowledge; (2) provides
incentives for owners to maximize the value of resources; (3) allows for
scalability of inputs; (4) goes a long way towards avoiding the tragedy of
the commons; (5) is a necessary precondition for exchange because it
reduces transaction costs; (6) can serve to diffuse political power; and (7)
helps individuals find personal meaning and fulfill life goals.141 These
advantages are real and would be acknowledged by most property scholars,
regardless of their progressive or conservative leanings. Unfortunately,
they are also subject to qualification, and in certain contexts these
advantages, especially numbers six and seven, may not materialize. Put
differently, the disadvantages of the property strategy may overwhelm
some of the advantages. Because the advantages identified by Merrill are
less controversial, I will spend more time exploring the disadvantages
138
The discussion of states and Native American tribes found in The Property Strategy is
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presented by Merrill.
First, the property strategy, according to Merrill, can create new
externalities. These externalities can be positive or negative, but by
dividing the world into separate spheres, the strategy may create incentives
to pass along costs (where there are negative externalities) or to not act for
the benefit of others (where there are positive externalities). The second
disadvantage Merrill identifies is that “granting property rights can create
monopolies with troublesome social consequences.”142 Third, private
property can interfere with services that require networks and linkages
(public access networks), which add value to private property, albeit by
compromising on the use of the property strategy.143 Fourth, the
exclusionary aspect of property—that it gives authority over property and
concentrates gains and losses in the hands of owners—means that the
property strategy “enhances the risk individual owners face.”144 Finally,
Merrill acknowledges that the property strategy “tends to promote
inequality.”145 In the case of all these disadvantages, Merrill acknowledges
that the solution may be greater state involvement in regulating property or
in limiting the property strategy.146
The last two disadvantages are the most damning. As Merrill observes,
“[s]ome would see the tendency for the property strategy to produce
inequality as sufficient grounds to condemn the institution as a matter of
distributive justice.”147 In a move that progressives are all too familiar
with, Merrill immediately moves from this observation to raise the idea
that property is theft and Marx and Engels’s position that private property
should be abolished.148 Though this might be considered a mild form of
red-baiting, Merrill goes on to note that many others “still find property’s
tendency to generate inequality troubling.”149 Merrill argues that the
welfare state in the form of “government safety nets” can mitigate the
downsides of risk associated with property, but funding such social
insurance through taxation amounts to a further qualification on the
property strategy.150 Though Merrill’s discussion of inequality does not
include discussion of safety nets, his argument logically includes the
possibility that the welfare state can reduce systematic inequality in a
similar way to how it lessens the downside risks associated with a property
strategy. Merrill concludes The Property Strategy by noting that because of
142
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the disadvantages associated with it, “we are unlikely to see any society
adopt an unadulterated property strategy.”151
Though framed as a celebration of the property strategy, Merrill’s
account of the connection between property and inequality overwhelms the
rest of his argument explaining and celebrating the strategy’s ubiquity.
When the pervasive inequality in the United States is read into Merrill’s
theoretical argument, a passage whose tone is intellectual ends up serving
as an elegy for property. Merrill writes:
Extreme inequality in the distribution of property undermines
all the reasons previously advanced as strengths of the
property strategy. If only a small number of people own
property, then the property strategy loses its advantage of
tapping into dispersed local knowledge. Further, incentives to
be productive will exist for only a few, there will be no
reduction in external transaction costs due to the presence of
large numbers of potential partners for exchange, and the
institution of property will offer little in the way of checks
and balances against concentrated power. In other words, the
tendency toward inequality should be disturbing to the
friends of property, as well as to the more conventional
egalitarians animated by considerations of distributive
justice.152
Reconciling this statement on the dangers of inequality with the
generally positive view of property found in the rest of the article is only
possible if one imagines that inequality is not a significant concern.
Otherwise, as Merrill acknowledges, inequality could undermine all of
property’s advantages.153 Friends of property (in which category I place
myself, despite the likelihood that my argument to destabilize property will
be read as a rejection of property) should be disturbed by the connection
between inequality and property. But judging by the inattention to
property’s tendency to promote inequality, and to inequality in general, at
best such friends have been fairly silent. There are, of course, scholars who
are concerned about inequality, but their interventions tend to be indirect or
limited. Whether because the system is taken for granted or because of
justifiable skepticism about the value of theory, few property scholars
consider the way inequality undermines the justifications and nature of the
property system at large.
Although not intended to do so, Merrill’s attack on the bundle of rights
offers a partial explanation for scholarly inattention to inequality. Similar
151
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to Smith, Merrill argues that the bundle is a poor metaphor because it fails
to provide answers to the questions we ask of property.154 The “formless”
bundle, Merrill explains, “highlights the complexity of the institution
without offering any views about its nature or content.”155 One could
respond by noting that this statement reveals its own fallacy; namely, the
fact that the bundle highlights property’s complexity itself says something
about the nature of property, especially when contrasted with Merrill’s
own effort to distill property into its essential characteristics, most
prominently exclusion.156 In place of the bundle, Merrill proposes that a
prism is a better metaphor because it captures the idea that property “takes
on a different coloration when viewed from different angles.”157 The first
two sides of Merrill’s four-sided prism are not surprising, as they closely
track Merrill’s prior work. From the perspective of “strangers”, Merrill’s
first side of the prism, property can be reduced to an easily understood
exclusionary command.158 If the first perspective is a version of Merrill’s
1998 Right to Exclude article,159 the second side of the prism corresponds
with Smith and Merrill’s pioneering article from 2000 on numerus
clausus.160 The perspective of “potential transactors” is a bit more nuanced,
but mandatory standardization of forms ensures that information costs are
kept in check.
The information cost theory loses its punch when it comes to the third
and fourth sides of the prism described by Merrill. On the prism’s third
side, property, as perceived by those within the zone of privity, allows for
“a tremendous diversity of rules and practices.”161 Merrill argues that even
here, information cost theory explains the abundance of forms because
those within the zone of privity can learn the particular contract-like rules
easily.162 But such an argument is fairly analogous to Merrill’s own
critique of the bundle in that it says nothing about the forms property will
take when information costs are not controlling.163 Merrill faces the same
154
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challenge when attempting to squeeze the fourth side of the prism—the
perspective on property of neighbors, or more broadly, “anyone who
experiences significant external effects from the way . . . property is
managed”—into the information cost theory.164 Here too, there are
“relatively high information costs.”165 This broad category does not lend
itself to a simple exclusion-based theory of property, unless the effects are
thought to invade protected property rights,166 or to a contractual
relationship since the parties are not in contract. In a move open to
contestation by those who see exceptions as integral to how rules are
understood, Merrill argues that on this side of the prism, “[w]here external
effects are concerned, context is everything.”167
In many respects, Merrill’s prism proposal signals a willingness to
enter into peace negotiations with progressive scholars. Although it seems
to stand at odds with the neo-natural law aspects of The Property Strategy,
Merrill describes property as “a social institution.”168 Merrill minimizes the
distance between essentialists who emphasize exclusion and nominalists
who reject the idea that property can be simplified in this way by arguing
that the disagreement “reduces to one stick.”169 By focusing as much as he
does in The Property Prism on elements of property that do not rest as
comfortably with the information cost theory, on the sides of the prism that
do not embody the property strategy but instead are complex and
contextual, Merrill creates space to reconcile conservative descriptions of
property with progressive critique. Put differently, the status quo bias
observable in celebrations of existing rules without regard either to how
those rules are experienced by those excluded from enjoying property or to
the possibility of improving on the existing structure, may be a matter of
choice, not oversight. With the final two perspectives on property found in
The Property Prism, and especially with the acknowledgement of the
disadvantages of property discussed in The Property Strategy, the choice
of information theorists to focus on describing the system and applauding
how it works cannot be dismissed as ignorance of the costs of the system.
Instead, this choice signals a belief that overall the rules work, or that there
is a need, as a normative matter, to fight against the possibility that the
rules will be further degraded by the long shadow of legal realism. By
acknowledging the different perspectives one can have on property and
164
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property’s disadvantages, Merrill invites both agreement with regard to his
description of property and disagreement about the power existing rules
should hold over the imagination.170
III. OVERRELIANCE
It is difficult to identify a single strand of scholarship as important to
progressive thought as information cost theory has recently been for
conservative approaches to property. But arguably, at the heart of
progressive property scholarship is the idea that those without title but with
a history of enjoying particular forms of property have some sort of right to
such property. Whereas conservatives have turned to formalism,
progressives emphasize the ways in which access to resources or a long
history of use can, and sometimes should, be graced with the property
label.171 Published nearly fifty years ago, Charles Reich’s The New
Property argued that government largess, including everything from
business licenses to welfare, should be associated with property
protections.172 A quarter century ago, Joseph Singer published The
Reliance Interest in Property, in which he argued that a reliance on
property—focusing on workers’ rights to a steel mill—can mature into a
recognized property right.173 These two works stand as two of the most
important contributions to progressive property scholarship since Felix
Cohen’s work on legal realism earlier in the twentieth century.174 Though
the two articles were written at different historical moments, they propose
similar solutions to the problems faced by the poor and the vulnerable.
They argue that some of the poor already have rights that should be
recognized as property rights, with the goal being incorporation into the
existing structure. These articles were radical in a sense: arguing that new
property and reliance interests should be recognized as part of the
generally accepted law pushes against the boundaries of property law. But
these arguments are also limited in that they embrace property law’s
vocabulary and legitimacy.175 Escaping this limit requires extending the
170
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insights from both works such that entrance is available even to those who
cannot ground their rights to basic security on property-type claims of
right.176
Given their canonical status, I am going to be brief in my overview of
The New Property and The Reliance Interest in Property. According to
Reich, property is important because it protects individuals from the
state.177 With the rise of the modern bureaucratic state, more and more
people are dependent on the government for their livelihood.178 Grouping
everything from broadcast rights and professional licensing to government
contracts and welfare, Reich argues that government largess should be
treated as a new form of property and protected as such.179 By showing that
there is not much difference between new property and traditional
property, Reich paved the way for the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize
procedural rights connected with welfare receipt.180 The promise of
Goldberg, contained in a case footnote citing Reich for the idea that
welfare is a form of property, was not taken up in subsequent cases and
was finally rejected when President Clinton signed welfare reform into
law.181 Despite this revealed limitation, Reich had made his scholarly
mark.182 New property was here to stay and it forced a reconceptualization
of property generally, opening up entire new areas to property scholarship
and showing the overlap between old and new property.
Singer’s masterful The Reliance Interest in Property similarly inspired
a generation of progressive scholarship. The hornbook version of the
article shows how a history of use of particular properties by non-owners
176
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through welfare reform that characterization was specifically eliminated).
181
As Professor James Stern explains, the Supreme Court “balked at the idea of extending takings
protection” to new property. Stern, supra note 126, at 281; see also Christopher Serkin, Passive
Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 357–59 (2014)
(detailing the Court’s refusal to “expand affirmative federal constitutional obligations to provide
welfare rights” after Goldberg). Merrill dismisses new property cases as “outliers,” arguing that “the
concept of property has been fudged.” Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 30, at 752. The welfarereform bill President Clinton signed in August 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, was an “end to the
statutory entitlement to cash assistance, replacing it with a block grant.” PETER EDELMAN, SO RICH, SO
POOR: WHY IT’S SO HARD TO END POVERTY IN AMERICA 86–87 (2013).
182
See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
751, 767 tbl. I (1996) (listing The New Property as the fourth most-cited article of all time).
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can, with time, become the foundation for legal rights associated with
those properties.183 Framed as a story about the reliance interests of
workers and their community in the context of the closing of steel mills in
Youngstown, Ohio,184 Singer argues that judges could have used existing
strains of property law doctrine to protect the reliance interests of union
workers.185 Though U.S. Steel asserted a right to unilaterally control the
destiny of the plants, including the right to destroy the plants, Singer
argued that the law could have and should protect the right of workers to
buy the plants in order to keep them operational.186 The article in many
ways serves as a blueprint for progressive property scholarship: it attacks
the idea of the free market,187 draws attention to the social obligations of
ownership,188 and emphasizes recognized positive rights.189 These ripples
have spread across the scholarly horizon. A less frequently observed aspect
of The Reliance Interest in Property is that it is grounded; it presents a new
theory for understanding property but does not lose sight of how the law
impacts people. Its lengthy discussion of the political economy of plant
closings could have been spun off into a separate article. But by building
his reliance interest argument around the historical moment, Singer shows
how theory can inform practice and, perhaps more unusual among property
scholars where theory is often divorced from practice, how context can
inform theory.
Together, Reich and Singer show the importance of labels, of
identifying something as “property.” Whether the subject is denial of
welfare benefits or plant closings, classifying something as “property” can
lead to greater legal protection. Though Reich and Singer deployed it to
advocate for the vulnerable, the idea that defining something as a property
right can provide individuals additional legal protection is neither
inherently progressive nor conservative. For example, Richard Epstein
employs the power of the “property” label to defend against state
regulation.190 By embracing all the sticks of the bundle as “property”
183
See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property Revisited, 7 UNBOUND: HARV. J.
LEGAL LEFT 79, 79 (2011), http://legalleft.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Singer_Reliance-InterestRevisited.pdf [http://perma.cc/L3TQ-LS4Y].
184
For more on plant closings, see Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty,
and America’s Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1758 (1993), and Staughton Lynd, Towards
a Not-For-Profit Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of Industrial
Property, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13, 13–14 (1987) (focusing on Youngstown).
185
Singer, supra note 23, at 621.
186
Id. at 617–21.
187
Id. at 633.
188
Id. at 659–60.
189
Id. at 663.
190
See Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of
Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 224 (2011), http://econjwatch.org/articles/bundle-of-rightstheory-as-a-bulwark-against-statist-conceptions-of-private-property
[http://perma.cc/MQH7-7NRV]
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subject to the Takings Clause, Epstein challenges the idea that the bundle’s
disaggregating potential gives more space for progressive interventions in
private property.191 Saying someone has a “property right” to something,
whether to an object or to a state of affairs, suggests that that person has a
legally protected expectation. For those for whom the status of their right is
a question, ascribing the label can be empowering and can be used to
defend against the operations of the state or the market.192 But there is a
downside to this move as well. If the vulnerable are incorporated into the
system using theories such as new property or the reliance interest, it
arguably serves to reaffirm and support the existing structure. This is
especially true where the argument is not that the theories are novel but
that they reflect existing law, or at least that existing law provides ample
space for them.
Whether the incorporation strategy evident in The New Property and
The Reliance Interest in Property is a good or bad thing depends crucially
on context. Are the claims that rights should be treated as property
legitimate? Does incorporation arrest broader challenges to the structure?
Are property rights the proper form of protection or are other avenues more
appropriate? Even under a property law regime that accepts claims to
rights tied to theories of new property or reliance interests, what groups
remain excluded and how should their rights be recognized? The answers
to these questions are necessarily context specific and, as such, defy allencompassing claims. Taking as a given a commitment to the idea that the
law should work for all, not just the privileged, the promise and limits of
Reich’s and Singer’s works raise the broad question of whether property
law is something you should work with or work against.
Of course, one response to these questions is to try to limit the
discussion, to reduce the scope of acceptable scholarship. James Stern ends
his recent article, Property’s Constitution, with a call for “renewed
emphasis on doctrinal consistency and symmetry,” which he explains,
“may supply a route through the tangled maze of normative argumentation
that surrounds the institution of property and reduce the occasions for
unfettered moral theorizing.”193 At first glance, Stern’s article itself seems
to do just this. Stern offers a theory for the Court’s takings jurisprudence
(arguing the “bundle-of-rights image” of property “offers the best path to preserving the institution of
limited government”).
191
Id.
192
Notably, critical race theory scholars faulted the critical legal studies movement for treating
rights dismissively for this reason. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (1987); see also John
Hardwick, The Schism Between Minorities and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: Requiem for a
Heavyweight?, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 137, 154–55 (1991) (describing the split between critical
race scholars and critical legal studies scholars).
193
Stern, supra note 126, at 326.
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that, as an explanation, arguably accomplishes his stated goal: “to make
sense of the law we have.”194 But in doing so, Stern argues that no
compensation is owed when the government takes away “new property”
entitlements such as welfare.195 While this position may accord with the
Supreme Court, Stern’s argument is not simply descriptive. Instead, Stern
argues, “[i]f a person loses a property right and the right does not then shift
to the government or to another private party, the person has been deprived
of property but has not suffered a taking.”196 Moreover, in its embrace of
doctrine as the limits of inquiry, Property’s Constitution ends up
advocating a normative vision of property as control over things, a concept
that Stern argues should be treated separately from “the distribution of
material wealth.”197 Again, the problem with this position is not that it is
inaccurate—as a description of the Supreme Court’s treatment of property,
it seems fairly accurate—but that it stakes out a normative position even as
it seeks to silence other perspectives on the morality of property. Stern may
be right, but a theory that sees property primarily as a tool to protect wealth
inequality, not as a tool separate from distribution, seems equally
plausible.198 Answering theory with formalism is comforting for those
seeking explanations but not if the goal is to understand what property
should become.
The argument that concerns about social obligations ought to be
channeled almost entirely through tax-and-transfer programs amounts to a
similar effort to take issues of inequality off the table. In The Affirmative
Duties of Property Owners, Robert Ellickson attacks the idea that property
law is the proper arena for tackling issues of redistribution.199 Citing
“[c]onsiderations of efficiency, horizontal equity, and relative institutional
competence,” Ellickson argues that distributional goals are best addressed
through tax-and-transfer programs, not property law.200 Although not
framed as such, Ellickson’s position can be summarized as a propertycentric version of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s earlier and well-
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Id. at 285.
Id. at 317.
196
Id. at 284.
197
Id. at 285. But see Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 416–17 (2012) (“Even physical property is far less amenable to
consolidated control than is sometimes thought. Most ownership rights are qualified. . . . In the eyes of
some theorists, these limits are exceptional; in the eyes of others, these limits are the norm. Either way,
property does not always or necessarily entail control.” (footnotes omitted)).
198
See Christopher Serkin, Affirmative Constitutional Commitments: The State’s Obligations to
Property Owners, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 109, 115 (2013) (explaining that to reduce
the role of the state to protecting private ordering amounts to “benefitting the rich at the expense of the
poor—the wealth of the few over the welfare of the many”).
199
Ellickson, supra note 7, at 44.
200
Id. at 66.
195
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201

cited tax-not-legal-rules argument. And it suffers the same flaws. A
recent article by Zachary Liscow does an excellent job laying these out.202
Liscow shows that even taking the efficiency-through-taxation solution on
its own terms, it does not serve as a generalizable rule because of tax-based
inefficiencies. Liscow explains, “redistribution through legal rules may be
inefficient and costly, but so is redistribution through taxation.”203 The idea
that redistributive legal rules should not be implemented because of
problems of horizontal equity, Liscow notes, “amounts to holding the
desperately needed aid for the poor hostage to the desire to help all of the
poor.”204 But the biggest flaw in Kaplow and Shavell’s, and now
Ellickson’s, taxes-are-more-efficient argument is the framing of the choice.
Claiming that scholars should abandon distributive concerns when it comes
to setting legal rules because of the possibility of a tax solution does little
more than make tax the deus ex machina solution to distribution and
property. It sounds nice in theory but breaks down in politics.205 Professors
201
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (developing the argument that
“redistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax
system”); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 821–22 (2000)
(addressing qualifications to the argument that legal rules should not be readjusted to redistribute
income); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
993 (2001) (“[M]any legal rules probably have little effect on the distribution of income.”).
202
Zachary Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should
Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2480–82 (2014); see also Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 327
(2006) (similarly deconstructing and critiquing Kaplow and Shavell’s argument).
203
Liscow, supra note 202, at 2482; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Trade-off Between Growth
and Equity, in 1 KENNETH J. ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: SOCIAL CHOICE
AND JUSTICE 190, 196–98 (1983) (detailing the range of costs associated with tax and transfer based
redistribution); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1677 (1998) (“[T]he question whether redistributive legal rules or taxes cause
greater distortion in work incentives is ultimately an empirical one and cannot be definitively resolved
by the sort of analytic argument offered in the existing law and economics literature . . . .”).
204
Liscow, supra note 202, at 2501.
205
In politics, redistribution to the poor remains politically contentious. Trends, though, seem to
be away from redistribution. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND
CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 3 (1st ed. 2005) (describing the movement to
lessen estate taxes despite such taxes’ only being collected from the wealthiest estates); JOEL F.
HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 3 (1995) (discussing the anti-poor political
environment that led to welfare reform); CHARLES LEWIS & BILL ALLISON, THE CHEATING OF
AMERICA: HOW TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION BY THE SUPER RICH ARE COSTING THE COUNTRY
BILLIONS—AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 6 (2002) (describing the tax evasion methods of
wealthy individuals and corporations, as well as the country’s permissive approach to such practices).
Moreover, redistribution through legal rules may, in some circumstances, be less politically costly than
accomplishing the same through taxes and transfers. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams,
Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction 5 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 704, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2504819 [http://perma.cc/BE6N4S59].
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Lee Fennell and Richard McAdams argue convincingly that “[a]ttention to
the reality of political action costs should mark an end to categorical,
empirically unsupported advice against pursuing distributive objectives
outside of the tax system.”206 As Lascow writes, “if transfers are
unavailable in practice, their theoretical availability is irrelevant; as a
result, the legal rule should adopt the second-best policy of taking equity
directly into account.”207 Suggesting otherwise may be intellectually
satisfying but it requires considerable distance from the limited American
political appetite for taxation and redistribution.
Rather than avoiding moralizing about property, progressive property
scholars embrace the connection between the law as it is and the law as it
could be. They answer the broad question on whether to work with
property to achieve progressive goals affirmatively. Although it is tempting
for skeptics, including myself, to see this as a case of property scholars
seeing nails all around, progressive scholars have offered new
interpretations of existing doctrine and traditions in property law as a way
of creating space for property law to better serve human values. Having
previously written a summary and partial critique of progressive property,
in this Article I am not going to present in detail Alexander’s socialobligation norm theory, Peñalver’s virtue ethics approach, or Singer’s
democratic model.208 Instead, my goal here is to suggest some reasons to
question the “work with” answer in light of property law’s tendency to
resist change.209 To further explore the “work with” stance towards
property, this next sub-Part considers a recent “property”-based argument
about how the law should respond to injustice and inequality: David
Super’s attempt to bring The New Property to bear directly on issues of
poverty and inequality in the wake of the Great Recession.210 Super’s A
New New Property illustrates both the power of property and the risk that
channeling progressive visions through a property-law framework will
limit them.
In A New New Property, Super argues that property law needs to be
expanded to secure the community and family rights of the poor in ways
that mirror the protection currently enjoyed by the wealthy. As the article’s
title suggests, Super’s proposal serves in many ways as an update and an
206
Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics 5
(Sept. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 420 (1981).
207
Liscow, supra note 202, at 2508.
208
For a detailed review of these contributions, see Rosser, supra note 44, at 116–23.
209
For a strong counter-argument “express[ing] slightly more confidence in property’s
progressive bona fides,” see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CALIF.
L. REV. CIRCUIT 349, 358 (2014), http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
MULVANEY_349.pdf [http://perma.cc/2R9S-966P].
210
See Super, supra note 24, at 1781–82.
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effort to reanimate aspects of Reich’s The New Property. Super shows that
while the legal response to The New Property was largely confined to a
layer of procedural protections for the poor, Reich originally was skeptical
that procedural rules alone would be enough to protect individuals,
particularly the poor, from the state.211 Super observes that “the dramatic
growth of inequality” in the fifty years that passed since the publication of
The New Property, was something Reich could not have fully
anticipated.212 Accordingly, A New New Property tackles the implications
of this rise in inequality on the role of property in society, or as Super
explains, “[w]hereas Reich’s primary focus was the subjugation
individuals face without property rights, this Article’s concern is the
consequences of extending property law’s protection to one segment of the
population but not another. . . . [T]his Article is concerned primarily with
property’s role in stratifying society.”213 Despite the difference in focus,
the prescription offered by Super is the same as that offered by Reich half a
century before: extend property protections to the poor.
The basic problem that Super identifies with property law’s role in
society today is that it operates almost solely for the benefit of the
privileged.214 Super writes, “[o]ur nation is, again, a house divided, with
one segment of the population enjoying the freedom that property rights
bring and the other lacking those protections.”215 Super establishes this
claim through a two-part argument. First, Super presents the widening gulf
since the 1970s between low-income people and the rich.216 As is
appropriate in a property article, Super emphasizes wealth disparities,
showing not only a racial component, but also how such disparities
negatively impact low-income people in everything from life choices to
political power.217 Second, Super extensively discusses four important
aspects of the lives of low-income people and their communities that lack
protection and could be extended such protection through the application,
directly or by analogy, of established property law concepts. Super uses
such examples as: the right of family integrity in the case of immigrants;
the protection of low-income communities from displacement; the work
that equity could do on behalf of the poor in the mortgage foreclosure
crisis; and the applicability of the Takings Clause to government support
211

Id. at 1780, 1785.
Id. at 1781.
213
Id.
214
See id. at 1782 (discussing how the nation operates more favorably to the wealthy).
215
Id.
216
See id. at 178698 (exploring the disparities in property ownership, including the racial
dimension to the disparities, the social impacts resulting from the disparities, the importance that
property ownership adds to the heath of democracy, and, finally, the difficulty in implementing public
policies to reduce wealth inequality).
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for the poor. By the end of the article, it is clear both that, because of
inequality, the country is in a precarious position and that the lives of lowincome people are unnecessarily vulnerable, especially in contrast with the
security enjoyed by the wealthy.
Property is arguably an odd choice of mechanism for the protection of
low-income people given the extent of its shortcomings, as Super notes. As
a leading poverty law expert, Super is perhaps uniquely situated to see the
limitations of property doctrines.218 Emphasizing that these limitations are
not just applicable to those below the poverty line, A New New Property
consistently refers to the affected population as “low-income people,” not
as poor people.219 This choice is not merely stylistic, as it not only prevents
the article from being drawn into the perennial battles over how poverty is
defined,220 but also highlights the connections between the poor, near poor,
and lower-middle class. Although I have adopted the shorthand, “poor,” in
this Article, as opposed to the preference for “low-income,” Super draws a
larger circle of concern, avoiding the negative connotations that often
attach to the poor.221 Super successfully drums home two related, but not
synonymous, points about property and low-income people. First, that
courts and policymakers are “disposed to protect the property interests of
the more affluent over those of low-income people despite the latter’s
greater dependence on that property.”222 And second, “that the law values
the kinds of interests affluent people typically have far more than those
upon which lower-income people depend.”223 These two points raise
related but not identical issues. If the problem is the first, that the property
interests of the poor are not adequately protected, then the solution is
straightforward: protect those interests. If the problem is the second,
however, to protect lower-income people’s interests as property, they first
have to be redefined as property. The first is the stuff of conventional
property law scholarship—indeed, in many respects it could be treated as a
218
For example, in an earlier article, he brought to light the hurdles that poor people face when
they try to raise an implied warranty of habitability defense in the context of an eviction for nonpayment of rent. David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 389, 405–13 (2011) [hereinafter Super, The Rise and Fall of the IWH]. Super’s poverty law
work is wide-ranging but focuses on privatization and the state of the welfare system following welfare
reform. See, e.g., David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy
Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2008); David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare”
Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1271 (2004).
219
Super, supra note 24, at 1785, 1798, 1818.
220
For a brief overview of alternative ways to measure poverty, see JULIET BRODIE ET AL.,
POVERTY LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1–24 (2014).
221
See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY
AND INEQUALITY 150–85 (2007) (giving a history of the demonization of poor single mothers).
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Super, supra note 24, at 1871.
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way of understanding progressive property scholarship in general. But the
second point is more akin to Reich’s pioneering discussion of new
property, and it is here that Super pushes the line on what counts as
property.
Standard fare among property law scholars consists of a fairly lean diet
of equitable servitudes, the numerus clausus principle, and similar
doctrine-heavy material that litter the property law canon. Reich, by
sewing together everything from the bar requirements for practicing law
and broadcast privileges, to welfare and military contracts, showed the
insight that could be gleaned by taking a broad perspective on what fits
within the property category.224 Super, in his first two examples continues
where Reich left off. It is not that property scholars have not written about
immigrant families, or social capital and poor communities,225 but these
examinations tend to discuss how traditional property topics intersect with
those groups, and do not, for example, argue that immigration law should
be understood in terms of a property right for families to remain intact.
Although the reasoning is tautological, precisely because these interests—
that of an immigrant family in remaining intact or that of a low-income
community in not being displaced—are not thought of as property, it is
hard to think of these interests as property. Super’s discussions of equity
and mortgages and of expanding the Takings Clause to protect low-income
people are a bit more conventional, but even there his proposals fall on the
radical side of property scholarship (though they likely will be more
quickly accepted among poverty scholars). In discussing what counts as
property, my goal is not to critique Super for employing a wide
perspective. But the need to have such a broad understanding raises once
more the question: why property?
Though A New New Property comes down on the side of supporting,
not undermining, property, Super is quite critical of property law. In a
passage worth quoting at length, Super highlights all that is wrong about
property:
Although . . . creative destruction still exists in economic
life—with particular businesses failing when they cease to be
efficient—much less of it remains in the body of property
law itself. Modern property law has lost much of the vitality
that long kept it at the center of Anglo-American law.
Property has overwhelmingly become the law of stability, a
drag on change in other areas. And as social and economic
224

See Reich, supra note 22, at 73437 (examining categories of government-created wealth).
See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in
Residential Property Law, 99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013); Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without
Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2013).
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change has driven demands for legal change, all too often the
legal system has not adapted property law but merely shoved
it out of the way. The mustiest, stodgiest aspects of property
law have come to dominate the field. Innovation is confined
to a few relatively insular areas such as intellectual
property.226
This passage from the article’s introduction expresses eloquently my
views and frustrations surrounding property.227 Taking a more optimistic
view of property, however, A New New Property ends by arguing that it
would be a mistake to lose faith in property. Super notes, “[t]he legal
concept of property has been at the heart of some of the most shameful
episodes in U.S. history. Those hoping for a brighter future could be
forgiven for wanting to dispense with property as a system of
individualistic trumps against the will of the state.”228 But Super goes on to
say that just as the civil rights movement made use of constitutional law
despite its “speckled history,” so to “the troubling aspects of property law’s
history should not prevent legal scholars from seeing its potential to protect
vulnerable people’s most important relationships.”229
But are there no other options; either latch on to property law
protections, albeit expanded versions of them, or be an unrealistic utopian
who fails to see the potential that lurks below the troubled history? Super
observes that the “disparities in property rights between the rich and poor”
can be addressed through redistributive transfers, which he—correctly—
rejects as politically infeasible or by expanding property to recognize
additional property right forms.230 I agree with both the idea that the rise in
inequality presents a tremendous challenge for property law and the related
observation that “[a]s long as property law single-mindedly emphasizes
stability in a dynamic world, it will become increasingly marginalized.”231
Where I part company with Super is in the notion that there are only two
options, and that those concerned about low-income people must therefore
seek to strengthen property. A third possibility is to weaken property
226

Super, supra note 24, at 1776 (emphasis added).
See Rosser, supra note 44, at 141–42 (critiquing property scholars’ treatment of intellectual
property as a realm of innovation while being fairly conservative when it comes to considering radical
changes related to distribution of real property).
228
Super, supra note 24, at 1878; see also Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and
Why Formal Private Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2030–31 (2012)
(arguing that formalizing property rights can make owners more vulnerable to the state); Edward L.
Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and Its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 573, 604 (describing the concept of property as a trump against the state as “a difficult argument
to take seriously” because “we are a long way past the time . . . when only property holders had liberty
rights”).
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Super, supra note 24, at 1878.
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protections for the rich or, at least, to condition the existing high level of
protection given the rich232 on expanding property protections, to reach
low-income people in ways they do not currently. There are points in A
New New Property that open the possibility for selectively weakening
property rights. For example, Super briefly acknowledges that, in some
contexts it might be appropriate to increase the property rights of the poor
and simultaneously deny those same rights to the non-poor:
Thus, instead of sardonically noting that “the majestic
equality of the laws . . . forbid[s] [the] rich and poor alike to
sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal . . .
bread,” this more nuanced vision would protect a homeless
person’s right to sleep outdoors while finding no
corresponding right for an owner of a conventional home to
sleep in public places.233
This acknowledgment is followed later in the article by an entire
section on reviving equity as a way to create space for selective
enforcement of the law.234 Although Super does not frame it as such, by
arguing that equity should protect borrowers facing foreclosure, he is also
arguing to weaken the property rights of lenders. From the perspective of
lenders whose rights would be trampled through Super’s revival of equity,
that equity does not abrogate “the underlying legal rule . . . it is simply
denied effect in a particular case,” providing little comfort.235 But the
overall push of A New New Property is to bring the property rights of lowincome people up to the level enjoyed by the wealthy, not the inverse, to
push the protections enjoyed by the privileged down.
Some readers of this Article, and of A New New Property, I suspect
will reject the very idea that property right protections depend on one’s
class position. The claim though that property law is neutral, something
that can be taken up by anyone and therefore is not subject to class
analysis, strips our understanding of property from its context in terms of
the inequitable benefit it gives those with higher incomes.236 I raised the
possibility of weakening property rights briefly in my last article,237 but it
remains unclear to me why the property protections that the wealthy
232
See Fennell, supra note 95, at 1488 (noting the societally incurred costs of “defining and
enforcing property entitlements”).
233
Super, supra note 24, at 1784.
234
Id. at 1840–68.
235
Id. at 1851.
236
See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (advocating “[l]ooking to the bottom—adopting the
perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise” to better understand the
law and find solutions to societal problems).
237
See Rosser, supra note 44, at 148–49 (exploring the possibility of diminishing the advantages
often associated with traditional property).

440

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:397

disproportionately enjoy are held sacrosanct, even by those driven to
advocate for the poor. Perhaps my favorite quote in A New New Property is
one Super credits to his clinic supervisor when he was a law student:
“Nothing gets people where they live like getting them where they live.”238
It is a brilliant insight, and one that suggests a more radical approach to
property law when coupled with Super’s observation that “the last four
decades have shown that substantial new antipoverty programs are not
enacted, except as the result of major political upheavals.”239 This echoes
the oft-repeated observation among progressive scholars that significant
changes to improve the lives of the poor or of minority populations come
about rarely and only as a result of tremendous push or circumstances that
create a crisis. Property does provide real benefits to people who have
access to it and whose interests are defined as property. This perhaps
explains Super’s hope of ratcheting up the property rights of low-income
people, so that their interests are protected in ways akin to the protections
afforded higher-income people. But getting there may require selectively
reversing the direction of the ratchet on the force of existing property
protections. Ratcheting downward can either equalize downward or
generate a crisis, such that low-income people find the support largely
denied them in the ordinary course of politics.
Perhaps it is unfair to critique the idea of trying to incorporate
vulnerable peoples into property law rather than challenging the law. But
underlying the belief that the system needs some reform while keeping the
basic structure intact is the idea that overall the law works. The response
accordingly is to suggest modifications to the law, not more radical
departures from it. This perspective could be characterized negatively as
that of the propertied or those who expect in the future to benefit from the
structure. But a more fair characterization is to describe it as the
perspective of those who see value in extending the structure.240 It is a
perspective that discounts the possibility that, for many people, property
might be primarily a constraint, rather than a way of protecting their
interests.
Can property law be otherwise? Laura Underkuffler writes, “[p]roperty
is, by definition, the protection of the status quo; it cannot, of itself, answer
the question of when there is a justified change in that status quo.”241
238
Super, supra note 24, at 1840 n.439 (crediting Marilyn Mullane, a former executive director of
Michigan Legal Services, with the quote).
239
Id. at 1875 (emphasis added).
240
As Zachary Bray explains, “the new progressive property is at least partially descriptive
insofar as it contends that American property law, at times, already recognizes the goals it endorses.”
Zachary Bray, The New Progressive Property and the Low-Income Housing Conflict, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 1109, 1113.
241
Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV.
2015, 2034–35 (2013) (emphasis in original); see also VAN DER WALT, supra note 13, at 215–21.
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Underkuffler’s idea, that property “has no meaning apart from the idea of
protection,”242 is an idea shared by other scholars who emphasize how
property is different from other rights because the right itself is not to
something independently valued, such as free speech, but is instead a right
to claim rights.243 Underkuffler explains:
Property, as an idea, is the establishment of entitlements. . . . It is the recognition, and protection, of the
individual’s rights in land; or rights in chattels; or rights in
any identified source of wealth. It is a right to the
continuation of the legal status quo. It has no other meaning.
As a result, property’s meaning—as an abstract
constitutional right—is threatened, profoundly, by the reality
of change, the inevitably of change, and the recognition of
the often-justified claims of competing public interests.244
If Underkuffler is right, and property has no other meaning outside of
protection of the status quo, then one can imagine two different roles for
the property law scholar. First, a scholar might embrace property law and
see his or her purpose as supporting property law, in the process providing
intellectual support for the status quo. Or, second, a scholar might see his
or her role differently, as being primarily concerned with change and be
open to deliberately threatening status quo’s vassal, property law.
Progressive property scholarship does not fit this dichotomy in that it
attempts to show how inclusionary theories can fit strains of property
law.245 As such, progressive scholarship is oddly situated in that it is both
opposed to the status quo, while generally supportive of the overall
structure of property law (and property doctrine). If, however, these two
positions are not compatible, perhaps more can be accomplished by those
seeking inclusion through active resistance to the property framework.
IV. APPLYING PRESSURE
If one looks at property not from the perspective of those who have
property, but from the perspective of those who are excluded and have
little chance of meaningful inclusion in the present system, the existing law
loses its luster.246 From such a vantage point, property law is less of a
means of protection against the state as much as it is a means of oppression
242

Underkuffler, supra note 241, at 2030 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 43.
244
Underkuffler, supra note 241, at 2016.
245
See Bray, supra note 240, at 1117–19 (providing an overview of recent progressive-property
accounts and how these fit within the overall property law configuration).
246
As van der Walt explains, “those on the margins of society experience the law differently from
those who hold privileged property positions.” VAN DER WALT, supra note 13, at 214.
243
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sanctioned by the state and disproportionately enjoyed by the few.247 As
Professor Eric Freyfogle notes, “private property empowers some people to
harm, dominate or otherwise control other people—even if only by
insisting that they stay away.”248 To correct for such power when taken too
far may require pragmatic destabilization of property law. Breaking down
the class and caste system in the United States may require pragmatically
undermining the security provided through property. Working against
property, rather than for or with property, is only radical in that it strikes
against the reification of property rights in our society.
Property rights are not ends in themselves and, accordingly, the level
of protection afforded property owners can, and should, be adjusted as
society changes.249 Hidden in the back-and-forth between conservatives
and progressives on the nature of property and the significance of rules
versus exceptions is the idea—championed by scholars of law and
economics for whom “the legal system [is] . . . up for grabs”—that
property rights are “malleable.”250 Emphasizing the idea that property
rights can change opens up the possibility of creating space to work against
the status quo—against traditional property law. While the position that
those concerned about poverty and inequality ought to leave property law
alone because tax-and-transfer programs are more efficient is attractive as
a theoretical matter, in practice such a position does little to respond to the
challenges of poverty and inequality.251 The United States is an outlier, in
the negative sense, compared to other developed countries when it comes
to using tax-and-transfer programs to lift people, including children, out of
poverty.252 Their security provided through property, the privileged can
remain indifferent or, worse, antagonistic towards low-income people.
Property scholars and property law should not remain on the sidelines as
the country continues down the path towards a rigid, largely non-porous,
class system.253 Indeed, as a pragmatic matter, lessening or threatening to
247
For the classic theoretical statement of this difference in perspective, see Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions 1917, supra note 37 (distinguishing between a right in personam as
against a distinct few, and a right in rem as against all). Hohfeld adds, “the reasons are equally great for
recognizing exclusively equitable rights against [in personam rights] . . . and . . . rights in rem.” Id. at
765 (emphasis omitted).
248
Freyfogle, supra note 176, at 441.
249
See Rubin, supra note 228, at 605–06 (concluding that the purposes of property rights have
changed as the goals of society have changed).
250
Fennell, supra note 95, at 1482, 1488; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 37, at 535
(arguing that law and economics scholars view property as being essentially the same as contract, a
collection of transferable but not special rights).
251
See supra text accompanying notes 199207 (describing the deficiencies of tax-and-transfer
systems).
252
BRODIE ET AL., supra note 220, at 25–26.
253
See Freyfogle, supra note 176, at 448 (noting how “little is said in economic writing about
property as a tool of domination . . . unequal property distributions, or about the ways markets
contribute to increased inequality and multiple social ills”).
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lessen the extent to which property rights are protected may be a uniquely
effective response.
Applying pressure to the existing structure may require destabilizing
property. Charles Sabel and William Simon explain, “[d]estabilization
rights are claims to unsettle and open up public institutions that have
chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are substantially
insulated from the normal processes of political accountability.”254
Property law, especially as it serves to protect a status quo marked by
inequality and inequity, I would argue, is this sort of institution. Whether
more explicitly, in the case of information cost theory, or more subtly, in
the case of progressive property scholarship, the status quo has a hold on
property law and may even define it. Moreover, as an institution that is
thought of as being somehow apart from politics and made up of
complicated background rules, it is fairly insulated from correction through
the political process even though it serves to protect the interest of an
increasingly small and self-perpetuating ownership class to the detriment
of the excluded. Destabilization may be the best path forward. Sabel and
Simon explain, “[d]estabilization induces the institution to reform itself in
a process in which it must respond to previously excluded stakeholders.”255
Roberto Mangabeira Unger first developed the idea of “destabilization
rights” in his 1987 work, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social
Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy.256 Unger advocated breaking
apart traditional property rights and reallocating portions of those rights
across government bodies and economic actors.257 Such a proposal could
be interpreted as merely an aggressive embrace of ripping apart the bundle
of sticks. As the author of one of the definitive texts on Critical Legal
Studies,258 Unger might predictably be inclined to draw upon New
Realism’s skepticism regarding absolute and traditional notions of
property. Destabilization rights according to this construction of Unger’s
attack on traditional property serve to tear property down but do little to
build up an alternative role for property.
If destabilizing property is nothing more than pulling out individual
sticks from the bundle, then, arguably, a cautious approach to the idea is
called for in light of both the concerns of information theorists and recent
events. As a brief reminder, Smith and Merrill fault the bundle-of-rights
conception of property because it suggests that the bundle can be torn apart
254
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1020 (2004).
255
Id. at 1056.
256
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530–33 (new ed. 2001).
257
Id. at lxxi.
258
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986).
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at will, which they claim misses the interdependent nature of many of the
sticks and fails to recognize the centrality of exclusion. The collapse of the
housing market and financial crisis of 2007–2008 arguably attest to the
problems with the bundle conception identified by Smith and Merrill.
Examples of moving from absolute property rights to more disaggregated
forms of property can be seen in collateralized debt obligations and similar
novel forms of property that pushed the housing market over a cliff.
Professor Heather Hughes argues that the crisis shows that to protect third
parties, numerus clausus principles arguably should guide limits placed on
the forms financial products can take.259 Others have gone further, blaming
fragmentation for the crisis and advocating a “closed set of forms” based
on the numerus clausus principle as a way to stabilize markets.260 The
apparent association between disaggregation and collapse is also
highlighted in a recent scholarly critique.261 Cristie Ford and Carol Liao
write, “[r]ecent events suggest that, somewhat contrary to Unger, power
relationships will reassert themselves in malleable social and economic
space, such as that created by a breakdown in traditional property rights.
The absence of formal ownership rights will make people more, not less,
vulnerable to nontransparent exercises of power.”262 Even though Ford and
Liao note that “[d]estabilization rights continue to play an essential, and
instinctively attractive, role in responding to the anti-democratic
entrenchment of powerful interests,”263 they see the proliferation of
property forms leading up to the Great Recession as a reason to stick with
traditional property.264 Ford and Liao’s view is that destabilizing property
ends up harming the vulnerable because “the disaggregation of property
seems to exacerbate inequality and allow for greater power to amass
among the already powerful.”265
The anti-bundle interpretation of Unger’s destabilization rights,
259
Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and Private Law, 20 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 33–37).
260
Note, The Perils of Fragmentation and Reckless Innovation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1799, 1821
(2012).
261
Cristie Ford & Carol Liao, Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, and the Derivatives
Revolution, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 889, 913 (2010) (“[I]t is clear in the wake of the global financial
crisis that the disaggregation of property . . . upset the normal market conditions for the exchange of
goods and services. Thus, market prices did not reflect the economy but rather a bubble . . . .”).
262
Id. at 890.
263
Id. at 929.
264
See id. at 89091 (adding that the “absence of formal ownership rights [in property] will make
people more . . . vulnerable to nontransparent exercises of power” and that “power, not property is the
core of [Unger’s works]”); see also Donald J. Kochan, Certainty of Title: Perspectives After the
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis on the Essential Role of Effective Recording Systems, 66 ARK. L. REV.
267, 282 (2013) (“Serious questions concern whether the legal infrastructure in the United States is
capable of handling the bundle concept taken to its extreme (with mortgage-backed securities as our
best test case).”).
265
Ford & Liao, supra note 261, at 897.
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however, is unfairly narrow. It contains elements of truth, but Unger’s
original idea of destabilization rights was as much about orientation as it
was about property forms. Unger argued destabilization is required
precisely in order to prevent the powerful from capturing the legal
apparatus.267 Destabilization rights “serve not to embody specific ideals of
human association but to ensure that, whatever the enacted forms of human
association may be, they will preserve certain minimal qualities: above all,
the quality of being readily replaceable.”268 False Necessity lays out a
vision for an alternative economic and political order, albeit a vision that
Unger later acknowledged was largely ignored.269 But the vision was more
a response to power relationships than a detailed set of plans. Put
differently, disaggregation of property rights was just the mechanism
Unger saw as a way to implement his large vision. Destabilization rights
were one part of Unger’s vision and they operate alongside with what
Unger calls “immunity rights”—basic individual rights and protections.270
Unger’s vision is therefore built around providing a basic level of security
and independence while also providing a mechanism to “break[] open . . .
insulated hierarchies of power and advantage.”271 In contrast with this
vision, property currently operates to preserve the status quo, preventing
effective challenges to hierarchical advantages and granting property
holders a great deal of independence and protection, but not making such
protection universal. Rejecting the notion of rights as rights to be free from
the state (in property, the castle model of ownership), Unger argues that
“[t]he point of destabilization rights is . . . to prevent recurrent,
institutionalized relationships among groups from falling into certain
prohibited routines of closure and subjugation.”272
If orientation is understood as being more important than form when it
comes to destabilization rights, one can think about ways of destabilizing
property that do not rely upon further disaggregating it. As critics of the
bundle are all too aware, even with the numerus clausus principle, property
can already be disaggregated, separated, and recombined in many ways.273
Unless property is understood in its most general sense as protection of the
status quo, it is hard to talk about property as being inherently conservative
266
See, e.g., UNGER, supra note 256, at 492 (stating that the “germ” of the idea can be seen in
loose government regulation and in the capital market); see also id. at 502 (noting that disaggregation
of property rights is not a novel idea and has been the norm in many societies throughout history).
267
Id. at 508 (“To prevent the emergency of economic entitlements that enable individuals to
control large amounts of labor, property must be disaggregated . . . .”).
268
Id. at 532.
269
Id. at xx.
270
Id. at 530.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 535.
273
See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 1, at 1568–69.
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or progressive. Limited equity co-ops exist alongside the fee simple,274 the
right to exclude is paired with cases limiting that right,275 doctrines such as
the implied warranty of habitability coexist with the American rule on
delivery of possession.276 The variety of possible forms property can
theoretically take does not, however, undermine the need to destabilize
property where property operates along a narrower range in practice. To
use a bad analogy, the fact that McDonald’s offers healthy options—milk,
salad, fruit—does not make McDonald’s a healthy option. Even though
progressive scholars are right to point out the existence of beach access
rules and the social aspects of ownership, the burgers and fries of property
law continue to be fee simple absolute and the right to exclude.277 Since
property law already allows for many forms of disaggregation, offering a
proliferation of such forms by itself will not destabilize the institution.
Instead, because of property law’s social and legal context, destabilization
involves seeking to undermine the role property protections play in our
society. In what follows, Part IV shows how property law can be
destabilized in two ways: through the selective use of existing law or
through pragmatic resistance to entrenched inequality. The goal of this Part
is not to make the definitive case for an against property strategy. Given
where the debates are taking place today, between conservatives who
largely work for property and progressives who work with property, it is
enough if this Part shows that destabilization should be included among the
alternative approaches considered for how the law can and should respond
to the challenges of poverty and inequality in the New Gilded Age.
A. Selective Use of Doctrine
In 1966, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward argued for a mass
274
For more on the mechanics and progressive potential of limited equity co-ops, see Duncan
Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided
Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85, 85 (2002) (arguing that limited equity co-ops are a “vehicle for subsidized
low-income housing”); Julie D. Lawton, Limited Equity Cooperatives: The Non-Economic Value of
Homeownership, 43 WASH. J.L. & POL’Y 187, 201–07 (2013) (describing the history of housing co-ops
as well as its two forms—market rate co-ops and limited equity co-ops).
275
Compare Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997) (recognizing “the
individual’s legal right to exclude others from private property”), with State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369,
371–72 (N.J. 1971) (noting that the right to exclude “does not include the right to bar access to
governmental services available to migrant workers”).
276
Compare Park W. Mgmt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (N.Y. 1979), superseded
by statute, N.Y. UNIFORM C ITY C T. ACT §§ 203, 209 (McKinney 2006), as recognized in Tardibone
v. Hopkins, 842 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (2007) (defining the implied warranty of habitability as “an implied
promise on the part of the landlord that . . . premises . . . are fit for human occupation at the inception of
the tenancy”), with Hannan v. Dusch, 153 S.E. 824, 830 (Va. 1930) (adopting the American Rule in
which a landlord need only deliver constructive possession to a tenant).
277
See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 9.05(B)(1) (2012) (noting that
the fee simple accounts for more than ninety-nine percent of privately owned land). The author thanks
Lee Fennell for this point.
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enrollment effort in public benefits in order to overwhelm the welfare
system.278 Piven and Cloward observed that only about half of those
eligible were receiving welfare and their hope was that an enrollment
campaign would force nationalization and expansion of welfare benefits.279
The strategy was designed to “precipitate a profound financial and political
crisis” and “produce bureaucratic disruption in welfare agencies and fiscal
disruption in local and state governments.”280 By generating a crisis, which
Piven and Cloward defined as “a publicly visible disruption in some
institutional sphere,” welfare rights advocates and recipients could pressure
politicians in Washington to support the right to a basic income for poor
people.281 Of course, in hindsight the record is mixed on Piven and
Cloward’s mobilization strategy. In the short-term, arguably lasting a full
generation, increasing numbers of eligible individuals and families got
access to needed benefits. But the longer-term record is more problematic.
Thirty years after The Nation published Piven and Cloward’s advocacy
piece, President Clinton, a Democrat, signed welfare reform into law.282
The expansion in enrollment, coupled with racist notions of recipients and
changing expectations regarding mother’s obligations, generated a crisis
after all, but one marked by popular backlash against welfare.283 As Piven
and Cloward recognized at the time, “[n]o strategy, however confident its
advocates may be, is foolproof.”284
Lots of lessons have been drawn from Piven and Cloward’s strategy,
but one important component of the strategy was that the crisis came out of
the law itself. A crisis could be created using the existing eligibility
categories, leveraging the “vast discrepancy . . . between the benefits to
which people are entitled under public welfare programs and the sums
which they actually receive.”285 The tools necessary to generate the crisis
were available through existing law; the trick was to call upon and make

278
See Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End
Poverty, NATION, May 2, 1966, at 510.
279
Id.
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Id. at 514 (emphasis in original).
282
See, e.g., EDELMAN, supra note 181, at 86–87 (explaining that President Clinton helped secure
his re-election by signing welfare reform into law).
283
See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER,
SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 256–64 (2014) (giving a political history of the “welfare queen”); Amy L. Wax,
Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of
Welfare Reform, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 275–80, 283 (2000) (connecting changing
expectations regarding women’s, specifically mother’s, work with political backlash).
284
Piven & Cloward, supra note 278, at 517; see also Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker
Cooperatives: Social Movement Theory and the Law, 14 NEV. L.J. 322, 340–41 (2014) (summarizing
Piven and Cloward’s assessment of the limitations of mass defiance).
285
Piven & Cloward, supra note 278, at 510.
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full use of the law, not to change it. To return to Unger’s formulation of
destabilization rights, Piven and Cloward recognized that destabilization of
the status quo could occur through selective use of the law.287 In partial
contrast with Unger’s elaborate redrawing of property forms, the
mobilization strategy drew upon existing categories to expand the class of
rights claimants.
This sub-Part of the Article looks at how existing features of property
law doctrine can be used to destabilize property holdings. Since property
forms already permit a great degree of variation on how property is held,
the focus is on weakening property protections to support a more inclusive
society, not on adding to the list of ways property can be held. I explore
two examples of using the law to destabilize settled property law
expectations. First, this sub-Part shows how the law helps create and
protect an inclusionary version of the market, in part by blocking
monopolistic holdings of property. Second, it presents ways the law can be
used to increase the power of vulnerable populations. As was true of Piven
and Cloward’s attempt to precipitate a welfare crisis, in each of these cases
the record is mixed, but they also illustrate the potential power of using
existing doctrine to destabilize property.
1. Democratizing the Market
While it is fairly easy to find property law doctrines that seem to
confirm or at least be based upon John Locke’s justification for private
property, the same cannot be said with regard to Locke’s proviso. Locke
famously argued that “[w]hatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.”288 And whether looking at original land claims in a wilderness,
adverse possession, or intellectual property rights to newly created items or
ideas, societal recognition of ownership seems to parallel Locke’s
argument. But Locke also limited his claim to an “unquestionable” right to
property to cases “where there is enough, and as good left in common for
286
Outside of the property context, the same strategy underlies the “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”
protests that erupted in the wake of the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri police.
Emanuella Grinchberg, Why ‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ Resonates Regardless of Evidence, CNN (Sept.
30, 2015, 9:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/10/us/ferguson-evidence-hands-up/ [http://perma.cc/
753C-F5JR].
287
See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1386–87 (1988) (connecting the
Piven and Cloward strategy with Unger’s theory of change, concluding that “the strategy toward
meaningful change depends on skillful use of the liberating potential of dominant ideology,” and
explaining how during the Civil Rights movement, Blacks “attempt[ed] to manipulate elements of the
dominant ideology to transform the experience of domination”).
288
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 27 (1690), reprinted in THE
NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW 376, 377 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
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others.” While it can be hard to come up with examples of the law
operating perfectly in line with Locke’s proviso, many market shaping
rules reflect an overarching concern with the effects of a concentration of
property holdings on society. Although property law often emphasizes the
importance of protecting individuals from both the state and from the
larger society, limitations on ownership help ensure that the economy is
not monopolized by powerful interests and, at times, limitations even
deliberately work towards democratizing markets.
Antitrust and anti-monopoly laws designed to protect the market—and
consumers—from monopoly firms are largely taken for granted today,
even though they do some violence to laissez-faire ideas regarding private
property and the role of the state.290 It is treated as a matter of course that
the merger of large companies should be subject to government review.
Similarly, when it comes to essential products that rely upon economies of
scale and that face few competitors, the government plays a significant role
in defining everything from level of service to price.291 What is perhaps
most remarkable about antitrust law and heavily regulated industry is how
unremarkable it all seems. Such limits become background rules rather
than sites of contention. That is not to say that they should always be
immune from politics. The trust-busting of the Progressive Era under
President Theodore Roosevelt helped bring the Gilded Age to heel. The
government has been comparatively weak when it comes to checking the
power of the New Gilded Age’s “too big to fail” companies, banks, and
hedge funds.292 But the larger point is that when it comes to concentrated
holdings that threaten competition or that could otherwise dominate
markets, the government’s responsibility to protect against these evils of
amassed holdings of property and power is generally accepted.
Similar concerns, arguably in line with Locke’s proviso, lie behind
limits on how owners and investors can develop real property. Instead of
Blackstone’s “sole and despotic dominion,”293 owners and developers
confront an array of zoning restrictions and permitting requirements. As
numerous scholars have shown, the effect of these processes is often

289
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See Arrow, supra note 203, at 193 (using anti-monopoly policy as an example of interference
with the market that can “improve both efficiency and equity”).
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See George J. Stigler, Monopoly, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON., http://www.econlib.org/
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exclusionary. But zoning also can protect against monopolization of
space by elites. Inclusionary Zoning, though typically viewed as merely a
form of government extraction, can also be viewed as a way to make sure
that attractive areas are not monopolized by the wealthy. The critique that
inclusionary zoning is not efficient295 does not address this separate value
of inclusionary zoning. Is inclusionary zoning destabilizing?296 From the
perspective of an owner accustomed to being able to do whatever he or she
wants with the property, it is incredibly destabilizing.297 But once inclusion
becomes a standard part of development, investor expectations take into
account the inclusionary requirement.298 When a developer seeks to
convert a large farm into palatial homes, inclusionary zoning can prevent
the entire area from being turned into McMansions.299 Inclusionary units
are not the same as the mythical commons, but a claim can be made that
the right of McMansion owners to their property is stronger because of the
existence of the inclusionary units. After all, inclusionary units reflect to
some extent the idea that property claims are strongest “where there is
enough, and as good left in common for others.”300
Homesteading and developer remedies provide two complicated
examples of how property law can protect against monopolies and
democratize the market. Complicated only insofar as the settlement of the
Midwest relied upon dispossessing Indians, homesteading rules sharply
limited the size of individual claims. The U.S. government could have sold
off the frontier to the highest bidder, but instead it helped create a robust
and deep system of family farming.301 This commitment to the ideal of the
294
See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888–89 (2006); David Ray Papke, Keeping the
Underclass in Its Place: Zoning, the Poor, and Residential Segregation, 41 URB. L. 787, 804–06
(2009); Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: Affordable
Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1667–73 (2013).
295
For the classic critique of inclusionary zoning, see Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of
“Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
296
Notably, Sabel and Simon answer this question affirmatively and use the Mount Laurel
litigation as an example of judicial destabilization. Sabel & Simon, supra note 254, at 1050–52.
297
Despite this destabilization, concern for such investors arguably should be limited: “As for the
claim that the landowner was surprised by the legal change and didn’t consider the danger, this is
mostly a plea of ignorance about how property works.” ERIC FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY:
FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 103 (2007).
298
See URBAN INST., EXPANDING HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING:
LESSONS FROM TWO COUNTIES (2012) (giving examples of how inclusionary zoning programs can
work and discussing the need to give developers clear program guidance).
299
See Andrew Rice, The Suburban Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at E114 (discussing such
a situation in Montgomery County, Maryland).
300
LOCKE, supra note 288, at 377.
301
See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property Law in a Time of Transformation: The Record of the United
States, 131 S. AFR. L.J. 883 (2014); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Enclosure of America 28 (Oct. 26, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024846 [http://per
ma.cc/8VGY-8R9K] (“During the days of Theodore Roosevelt, early in the twentieth century, forester
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yeoman farmer has not always led to the best policies, but in the
homesteading example it served as a hedge against property becoming
overly concentrated in the hands of industrial employers and land
barons.303 Conceptually more complicated, the developer remedies that
arose out of challenges to local exclusionary practices in New Jersey also
create access and democratize markets. Depending on perspective,
developer remedies either expand the rights of property owners or limit
them. Created in response to the Mount Laurel decision,304 which required
suburbs not to foreclose the possibility of moderate and low-income
housing, developer remedies provide a path through permitting processes
where the development includes affordable housing.305 For developers
stymied by local red tape, the remedy amounts to an expansion of their
rights as owners of the land to be developed. But for neighbors who had
long used their property interests in the community as a not-in-mybackyard shield against undesirable developments and newcomers, the
developer remedy lessens the de facto exclusionary power that previously
was associated with homeownership. Similarly, rights to place mobile
homes or to build accessory dwelling units can lessen the rights of
neighbors even as they increase the development rights associated with
ownership of particular parcels. In all these cases, such development rights,
to the extent that they bypass cumbersome local processes and permit the
construction of more affordable housing, positively destabilize propertyGifford Pinchot used this same rhetoric to justify getting the federal government involved in
conservation, particularly in the business of building dams and big irrigation works to open-up new
lands for families to settle.”).
302
See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the
impact of allotment on Indian tribes).
303
See Note, Distributive Liberty: A Relational Model of Freedom, Coercion, and Property Law,
107 HARV. L. REV. 859, 871 (1994) (“Most of the restraints on accumulation, alienation, and use that
the Reformers proposed can be understood as attempts to counteract the withholding capacity of large
landowners and to extend the staying power of settlers in order to make small freehold farming a viable
alternative life plan.”). The relative ease of incorporating business entities in the United States provides
a similar example of how the law can protect against undue concentrations of wealth. Where the right
to incorporate is either extremely limited—as it was when corporate charters had to originate from the
crown—or subjected to endless red tape, competition is either stifled or driven underground. But where
incorporation is routine, is largely a given, and is not overly burdensome, the state preserves “enough”
market participation rights. Though not within the traditional ambit of property law, fair and fast
incorporation mechanisms can reduce the power of entrenched interests. Though in the United States
the ability to assume the corporate form is taken for granted, the experience of other countries shows
the nexus between property rights and Locke’s proviso when it comes to incorporation. See HERNANDO
DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS
EVERYWHERE ELSE 209–17 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of getting rights recognized in developing
countries).
304
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 716 (N.J. 1975).
305
See DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1996)
(giving a detailed history of the political and legal fight to build low-income housing in Mount Laurel,
New Jersey).
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based expectations.
It is one thing to create broad-based markets or distribute rights in a
more egalitarian manner; it is another to take away advantages and
holdings that are already enjoyed by a select few. Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff illustrates the extra complications associated with the
latter.306 Midkiff involved an effort by the state of Hawaii to use its eminent
domain authority to transfer land, involuntarily, from a private landowner
to private lessees.307 Hawaii passed a land-reform act that provided for this
transfer of land in order to, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court,
“reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligarchy.”308 In
this case, the “land oligarchy” was land formerly held by the Hawaiian
monarchy.309 Though the Midkiff Court’s holding that eminent domain can
be used to transfer land from one private party to another if there is a
legitimate public purpose foreshadowed the decision in Kelo v. New
London,310 the holding was unanimous and straightforward.311 As the Court
in Midkiff noted, “[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is
a classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”312 The Court concluded by
declaring that “to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property
ownership” is a legitimate use of state authority.313
What this sub-Part shows is that when property law takes seriously
Locke’s proviso, it can play a destabilizing role, acting as a check on the
power of elites. The legal mechanism can take many forms: preventing
monopolies from being established, ensuring that emerging markets or new
resources are broadly distributed and accessible, and even using the law to
take away rights from property owners where holdings are too
concentrated.314 Seeing the destabilizing element in some of these
examples is difficult because the relevant laws and principles have become
sufficiently established that they move into the background. Yet, thinking
about areas where these principles could be applied reveals the potential
306
467 U.S. 229, 231–34 (1984) (explaining the complications that the Hawaii legislature faced
when it intended to transfer land ownership from the few to the many).
307
Id. at 233–36.
308
Id. at 241–42.
309
Id. at 242.
310
Id. at 245; see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (holding that New
London’s comprehensive economic rejuvenation plan constituted a public purpose required to exercise
the power of eminent domain).
311
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (clarifying that “‘it is only the taking’s purpose, and not its
mechanics,’ . . . that matters in determining public use” (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244)).
312
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242.
313
Id. at 245.
314
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (concluding that legislatures are afforded “broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power”). For a discussion of the
background and impact of the Kelo decision by some of the attorneys who participated in the litigation,
see Bethany Berger et al., Selected Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Thomas R. Gallivan Jr.
Conference—Kelo: A Decade Later, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1433 (2015).
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destabilizing effects of a commitment to democratizing markets. The
motivated state might do more to limit the power of concentrated wealth,
as in the case of brick-and-mortar giants such as Wal-Mart at a national
level and particular manufacturers at a local level, as well as new economy
monopolists such as Amazon and Apple. Though demand to curb the
power of firms such as Goldman or the Blackstone Group is limited largely
to fringe protest movements,316 property law has the potential to be used as
a tool to rein in powerful entities in order to shape an inclusive form of
capitalism.
2. Turning Representation into Power
Given the inequities in access to lawyers, simply ensuring that the poor
have legal representation can be destabilizing. This is especially the case
when representation and advocacy are undertaken strategically. An
ongoing debate among poverty lawyers involves whether or not legal aid
offices should focus on individual representation (“access”) or on
systematic change.317 The common ground in this debate, and the crucial
point when it comes to destabilization, is that lawyers matter.318 And they
can matter for whole groups of people, even where lawyers are forced to be
selective in terms of which clients and what types of cases they take on.319
The idea that lawyers matter is such a simple observation that it can be
hard to see the destabilizing aspects of representation. After all, the job of a
poverty lawyer is often simply to help in the assertion of rights, including
property rights, and often does not involve the assertion of novel claims of
right.320 Even where the anti-poverty lawyer pushes for an expansion in the
protection of the poor, the claims generally are fairly straightforward; this
would not be permitted if these people were not poor so it should not be
315
See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Race, Class, and Markets: Social Policy in the 21st Century, in
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 126–29 (David B. Grusky & Ravi Kanbur eds., 2006) (presenting more
radical ways of creating and shaping markets so that they are inclusive of racial minorities and the
poor).
316
See Andrew R. Sorkin, Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy that Fizzled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012,
at B1 (highlighting the Occupy Wall Street movement).
317
See, e.g., BRODIE ET AL., supra note 220, at 641 (“The . . . right to counsel movement is not
uncontroversial even among poverty lawyers and those unquestionably committed to advocacy for the
poor.”); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970) (arguing
that poverty lawyers should focus on changing the system instead of simply representing their clients).
318
See Debra Gardner & John Pollock, Civil Right to Counsel’s Relationship to Antipoverty
Advocacy: Further Reflections, in BRODIE ET AL., supra note 220, at 643 (“[T]he mere presence of a
guaranteed attorney in indigent tenants’ cases and landlords’ awareness of that presence should cause a
seismic shift in the treatment of tenants . . . .”).
319
See Wexler, supra note 317, at 1055–56 (explaining that though “[t]urning people away is
difficult,” there are several ways lawyers can help poor groups of people).
320
See Edgar S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317,
1338 (1964) (“The assertion of a right in even a single case can have community-wide
ramifications . . . .”).

454

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:397

allowed. The police should not burst into welfare recipients’ homes late at
night to search for an undeclared man in the house.321 An applicant for
public assistance should not have to pay for a drug test as part of the
application.322 A person should not lose his or her home because their
grandchildren or caretaker uses drugs.323 The government should not take
away support it provides for people’s basic needs without a hearing.324
Children should not receive a substandard education just because of their
race and where their parents live.325 People should not have to pay rent if
the unit is not fit for human habitation.326 It is only in the context of a
society as enamored with the linked ideas—that America is the land of
opportunity and that the poor are largely undeserving—that such
straightforward claims are seen as matters of law reform instead of selfevident truths.
Even where the claims are unlikely to reach the Supreme Court, simply
affording representation to the poor can destabilize the property owners’
ordinary expectations. When the norm is that the poor do not have legal
assistance, effective assertions of rights by the poor can diminish the
property protections enjoyed by owners.327 For example, a tenant facing
eviction fares much better when assisted by counsel.328 Not only does the
legal services attorney in this example protect the rights of the tenant, but
he or she also lessens the de facto power the owner has over the unit.329
321
See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (invalidating an Alabama regulation that
removed federally funded assistance for impoverished children if a substitute father was present in the
household).
322
See Lebron v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2013)
(holding that a mandatory drug test for public assistance applicants is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment).
323
But see Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (concluding that
public housing authorities have discretion “to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the
household or a guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should
have known, of the drug-related activity”).
324
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (explaining that procedural due process rights
require a pre-termination evidentiary hearing when welfare is discontinued).
325
But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973) (upholding
Texas system of school financing based on property taxes that led to unequal expenditures between
children in different districts).
326
See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (implying a
warranty of habitability in all leases governed by the District of Columbia’s housing regulations).
327
See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 320, at 1339–40 (recounting a time when the presence of
lawyers asserting rights in a tenant-landlord dispute provided enough bargaining leverage to induce
settlement).
328
See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data
Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 48 (2010) (“One variable that
often can halt the swift judgment for the landlord is representation for the tenant, with the likelihood of
eviction dropping precipitously.”).
329
See Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good Faith
as a Limitation on the Landlord’s Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 483 (1985) (stating that
traditionally landlords have had control over rental homes because of their termination power).

2015]

DESTABILIZING PROPERTY

455

One can imagine the transformative power of expanding the right to
counsel for the indigent to civil cases.330 Though the goal of the “civil
Gideon” movement is often framed in terms of individual rights, it is easy
to see that such a right likely would have a structural impact on how
property law operates in practice.331 In light of the blows the Supreme
Court has dealt right-to-counsel claims and predictable underfunding of
legal aid by Congress, however, a national flood-the-courts strategy
belongs largely in the realm of the imagination.332 But the country’s lack of
commitment to broadening the right to counsel for the indigent does not
mean that property law cannot be destabilized through representation, only
that doing so involves acting strategically.
What this sub-Part shows is that targeted interventions in the ordinary
workings of property law can be used to protect vulnerable populations by
changing the power dynamics of the market. The interventions can take a
number of forms and involve different actors, but the goal is to weaken the
ability and power of owners to use property rights to their advantage.
Three types of interventions through coordinated representation stand out:
place-based, party-based, and claim-based.333 In the first, lawyers agree to
focus their efforts on a geographically defined space.334 The goal is not
necessarily to change the overarching laws affecting their clients, but to
change the market dynamics operating within that space by rigorously
advocating for people within the area.335 In the second, legal assistance is
directed not to the poor in general but to particular parties who have shared
characteristics.336 This strategy can be based on particular characteristics or
needs of the poor, their employment, their legal status, their race, or their
gender, and the strategy is designed to challenge how the law treats that
issue. Again, the goal is not explicitly to change the law, only to change
330
See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1799 (2001) (arguing
that “opportunities for legal [civil] assistance are crucial to the legitimacy of the justice system”).
331
See Clare Pastore, A Civil Right to Counsel: Closer to Reality?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065,
1081–82 (2009) (considering the potential systematic concerns over extending the right to counsel to
civil cases).
332
See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (failing to extend Gideon to the civilcontempt-with-imprisonment context); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s
Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 770–71 (2015) (detailing the “woeful underfunding” of legal services).
333
See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and Community
Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2009) (categorizing people-based
strategies as those that “invest in individuals, often with the explicit goal of allowing those individuals
to move to a better life” and place-based strategies as those that “target specific communities or
locations, often with the explicit goal of revitalizing entrenched pockets of poverty”); Marc Feldman,
Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1538 (1995) (explaining the goal of
a claim-based strategy as those that “seek to advance the interests of a number of poor persons by
‘reforming’ some widespread practice or abuse”).
334
Davidson, supra note 333, at 1.
335
See id.
336
See id.
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how the law is enforced through a concentrated effort to ensure the poor
get the full benefit of existing laws in a way that does not occur in the
absence of legal assistance.337 In the third type of intervention,
representation is not based on geography or the particulars of individual
clients, but on the nature of the claims that can be brought. To some
degree, of course, the third type incorporates elements of the previous two
types, but the strategy can be distinguished because here the goal is to
change the law.338 Commonly described as impact litigation, the hope is to
find just the right client, just the right defendant, and a practice or law that
calls for judicial correction rather than simply attempting to alter
enforcement costs.339
These strategies need not operate independently, though frequently
they do because of the ways institutions are organized along lines that
mirror these intervention types. Thus, lawyers working for or with a
geographically-based community economic development (CED)
organization are likely to adopt approaches that are defined by the area
served by the organization.340 This silo effect can also be observed in
party-based entities, such as those created and funded to be, for example,
employment justice centers or immigration defense clinics. Similarly, the
expertise and capacity of claim-based organizations—best exemplified
perhaps by those trying to advance racial justice such as the NAACP,
MALDEF, NARF, and AALDEF—are often focused on appellate
advocacy in the hopes a single case will have a big impact.341 But whether
operating independently or as part of a larger strategy, these three types of
interventions can all destabilize how—in the absence of legal assistance—
property law ordinarily works against vulnerable or disadvantaged
populations. This sub-Part focuses on ways selective use of the law,
drawing upon one or more of these types of interventions, can help secure
poor communities against market forces that would otherwise make their
housing unaffordable. Similar forms of destabilization through targeted
representation can be identified across many other areas of law—labor law,
337
See, e.g., Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 121 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982)
(describing this in terms of “a strategy of using every available procedural technicality and
objection . . . transforming an extremely inexpensive and brief legal proceeding into a very costly and
time-consuming one”).
338
Feldman, supra note 333, at 1528.
339
See id. at 1537–38 (distinguishing service and impact cases).
340
See David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan
Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701, 720–25 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001))
(critiquing the CED movement for being too locally focused).
341
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 472–77 (1976) (reviewing the NAACP’s litigation
strategy to achieve desegregated school systems).
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immigration law, family law, discrimination law, etc.—that are seen as
separate from property law even though they have significant property
implications. But a focus on communities and housing is both convenient
and appropriate, drawing as it does upon examples solidly within the
property law sphere.
In practice, these interventions involve selective use of property law to
protect the well-being of the poor by helping to secure communities
against market forces. Through targeted and aggressive defense of tenants
facing eviction, lawyers can fight against market forces that would
otherwise operate to displace low-income people.342 Property law already
provides tenants with a right to not have to live in terrible conditions
through the implied warranty of habitability (IWH).343 In areas where
claiming a violation of the IWH is not conditioned on paying rent into an
escrow account, the IWH can be an effective defense against eviction for
non-payment.344 Yet, the likelihood that tenants will raise eviction defenses
effectively is closely linked to whether they have legal assistance.345
Without knowledge of the IWH or legal assistance, the IWH can become
merely a paper right that does little to slow down the eviction machine.346
Targeted and aggressive representation, however, can “make the eviction
process expensive and difficult for the landlord, thereby slowing
gentrification and blocking displacement.”347 This is not a new idea; during
the 1980s and 1990s, eviction free zones (EFZs) were pushed as a matter
of practice and scholarship by Harvard Law School professors, students,
and alumni.348 As a leading article on EFZs explained, “[t]he point of the
strategy is to launch a form of legal guerilla warfare. . . . [T]he lawyer uses
any legal means at hand to bring about the desired result of increasing the

342
See, e.g., Lazerson, supra note 337, at 128–35, 148–56, 160 (showing how aggressive use of
legal formalism by legal aid attorneys can change the nature of evictions proceedings).
343
For an overview of the development of the IWH, see Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years
After the Revolution: Observations on the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 793, 795–809 (2013).
344
But see Super, The Rise and Fall of the IWH, supra note 218, at 432–33 (explaining that in
jurisdictions that require escrow payments, “very few low-income tenants appear to receive relief based
on the implied warranty of habitability and related doctrines”).
345
See D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study
in a Massachusetts Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 927 (2013) (analyzing
a study in which representation in eviction proceedings most likely reduces the probability a tenant
ends up vacating a dwelling by between twenty-five to thirty-five percent).
346
See Super, The Rise and Fall of the IWH, supra note 218, at 406–07 (considering how lowincome tenants know about the warranty of habitability).
347
Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism, PostModernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 763 (1993).
348
See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charn, Paths Not Taken: Some Comments on Feldman’s Critique
of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633, 1664–65 (1995) (explaining the Eviction Free Zone
Project in Boston).
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349

time and expense needed to evict tenants.” What is important for this
Article is that EFZs demonstrate the destabilizing power existing doctrines
can have when they are employed creatively, in this case, through
geographical targeting. EFZs attack the expectation landlords have that
they will be able to convert their units from low- to high-rent units or to
sell off their units as the neighborhood improves. Positively, EFZs can help
slow or block gentrification, preventing market changes from displacing
whole communities. But the strategy does so at some cost to ordinary
expectations regarding the significance of property ownership.350 From the
owners’ perspective, this targeted use of IWH allows lawyers to undercut
owners’ rights to control and freely alienate their property.
Housing advocates responding to the expiring use problem in public
housing use a similar type of legal guerilla warfare. The expiring use
problem is the result of federal programs that provided financial and tax
incentives for the construction of rental housing in return for developers
agreeing to house low-income tenants for an agreed upon period of time
ranging from twenty to forty years in new or newly renovated
complexes.351 At the end of that period, the developer’s obligations under
the contract are met and, if the local market conditions will support it,
those units can be turned around and rented at a much higher market
rate.352 Of course, calling the expiring use phenomenon a “problem” is
arguably misleading because the “problem” is built into the public/private
agreement: the restrictions were time-limited to begin with. But that has
not stopped housing lawyers from aggressively fighting to keep lowincome tenants in these complexes and from fighting to convince complex
owners to agree either to extend the use restriction or to sell the properties,
at a discount, to non-profit housing providers. Legislation designed to
349
Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics of Legal Bricolage in the Fight
Against Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 518 (1991).
350
See Aya Gruber, Public Housing in Singapore: The Use of Ends-Based Reasoning in the Quest
for a Workable System, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 236, 265 (1997) (“The argument is that legal service
centers, by vigorously enforcing the warranty of habitability as an anti-eviction measure [in EFZs], are
using immoral, or at least improper, methods to achieve the positive goal of housing the poor.”).
351
For an excellent summary of the relevant programs as well as newer programs designed to
keep units in the programs through additional subsidies, see EMILY P. ACHTENBERG, LOCAL
INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., STEMMING THE TIDE: A HANDBOOK ON PRESERVING MULTIFAMILY
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 8 (Neil Carlson & Vincent F. O’Donnell eds., 2002); see also Lawrence Geller,
Note, Expiring Use Restrictions: Their Impact and Enforceability, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 157–67
(1989) (explaining the background of expiring use programs); Michael Quirk, Note, Preserving
Project-Based Housing in Massachusetts: Why the Voucher Discrimination Law Falls Short, 30 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 651, 656–67 (2011) (detailing the history of various federal affordable housing
programs).
352
For example, the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC)
estimates that in Massachusetts alone, over seven thousand low-income units expired during 2014 and
over nine thousand units are at risk of expiration in 2015. CEDAC, EXPIRING USE INVENTORY REPORT
1 (2014).
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support non-profit or government buyouts of such housing projects
provided additional support for this tactic by imposing additional terms on
developers long after the original investment and construction contract was
signed.353
The work of public interest lawyers in both the EFZs and expiring use
contexts involves using existing tools to actively destabilize the property
rights of landlords and developers. Richard Thompson Ford describes such
work as “‘informal justice’, a legal practice quite distinct from that
imagined by traditional jurisprudence.”354 Ford explains that “[i]nformal
justice uses legal argument as a strictly tactical device, with no regard for
the formal purposes underlying the law.”355 Ford’s explanation, which goes
on to highlight the distinction between traditional individual representation
and “a larger strategy to stall gentrification,”356 is arguably a bit inaccurate
in the case of the use of the IWH to support the community rights of lowincome tenants living in either an EFZ or a project with use restrictions set
to expire. After all, when Judge Skelly Wright invented the IWH in Javins,
he did so in part because of the larger social context.357 But Ford’s general
description of the manipulative work of such a “radical lawyer” seems fair:
“She takes the legal system and the legal culture as given and attempts to
manipulate the outcome of cases to further her ideologically based
goals.”358 This approach destabilizes property holdings and the
expectations surrounding ownership using existing doctrine, without
inventing new categories or forms of property.
An understandable response to the above discussion of EFZs and the
expiring use problem is to see these examples as dated, and perhaps
irrelevant, to property law today. But several of the borrower-side
responses to the foreclosure crisis show the continued reach of informal
justice. The Great Recession began with property, with problems in the
housing market tied to the bursting of the housing bubble,359 yet
353
See Geller, supra note 351, at 167 (describing the Emergency Low Income Housing
Preservation Act of 1987, which prohibited developers from exercising their prepayment rights in order
to get out of the use restrictions); William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development
Movement, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 377, 396 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4110(b) and describing a requirement that
developers give non-profits, government entities, and residents an exclusive right to bid for an initial
period before the project is fully put into the market).
354
Richard Thompson Ford, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood, 48 STAN. L. REV.
217, 238 (1995) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993)).
355
Id.
356
Id. at 238–39.
357
See Letter from J. Skelly Wright to Professor Edward H. Rabin (Oct. 14, 1982), reprinted in
Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 517, 549 (1984) (discussing the social and economic dynamics that influenced
landlord-tenant law).
358
Ford, supra note 354, at 239.
359
See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1607, 1610 (2010) (noting that the current economic crisis is grounded in property).
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government efforts initially focused on “shoring up the banking system
even if this means subsidizing the very institutions that caused the financial
crisis in the first place.”360 Bank bailouts protected lenders from losses
associated with bad mortgages, risks of which were held in a variety of
forms including securitized debt obligations and credit default swaps. In
contrast, little federal support reached individual borrowers.361 As Nobel
laureate Joseph Stiglitz observed, “the bailout strategy put the interests of
the banks (and especially the large banks) and bankers ahead of the rest of
our economy.”362 Lacking a similar government bailout to individuals,
borrowers and their attorneys had to come up with creative ways of
blocking or slowing down the foreclosure machine.
One set of proposals sought to impose new terms on lenders,
essentially trying to cram down the mortgages, forcing lenders to accept
rewritten contracts at a fraction of their face value or with additional rights
for borrowers.363 Although the idea of rewriting mortgages received
considerable attention, ultimately it went nowhere.364 Anti-borrower
sentiment (“why should irresponsible borrowers be let off the hook”)365
360

Singer, supra note 183, at 81.
See Gupta, supra note 26, at 549–53 (noting the unsuccessful attempts of the federal
government to address the housing crisis); Dan Immergluck, Too Little, Too Late, and Too Timid: The
Federal Response to the Foreclosure Crisis at the Five-Year Mark, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 199
passim (2013) (discussing the inadequate federal response to the foreclosure crisis).
362
STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 245.
363
Robert Hockett advocates, over a number of articles, the use of eminent domain as the solution
to the problem of underwater mortgages. See Robert Hockett & John Vlahoplus, A Federalist Blessing
in Disguise: From National Inaction to Local Action on Underwater Mortgages, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 253, 266–69 (2013) (stating that cities and states can easily use their eminent domain authority to
ultimately modify loans and thus make them payable); Robert Hockett, Accidental Suicide Pacts and
Creditor Collective Action Problems: The Mortgage Mess, the Deadweight Loss, and How to Get the
Value Back, 98 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 55, 66–71 (2013) (advocating that state and municipal
governments comprise the collective agent best equipped to address collective action problems
preventing principal write-downs); Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation
Proceedings and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 149–67 (2012) (detailing the Municipal
Plan, which is designed to “sidestep all of the unnecessary impediments that presently block
meaningful debt revaluation and attendant value maximization”). Other proposals include expanding
homeowner bankruptcy rights in foreclosure against mortgage holders. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home
Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2261, 2265 (2008) (considering “mortgage delinquency management tools through the lens of
purported ends of housing policy, including whether they honor and further the goals of wealth
building, positive social-psychological states, and community development”).
364
See, e.g., Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 748 F.3d 28, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2014)
(discussing the issue of rewriting mortgages). But see Robert Hockett, “We Don’t Follow, We Lead”:
How New York City Will Save Mortgage Loans by Condemning Them, 124 YALE L.J. F. 131, 131–34
(2014) (suggesting that eminent domain proposals may still be attempted).
365
See Gupta, supra note 26, at 54447 (noting that blame has often been placed on
homeowners); Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime
Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 510, 537 (2013) (discussing
social perceptions of risky borrower behavior).
361
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366

and the lobbying power of the banks staved off legislative change, and
courts were generally reluctant to undo or alter valid contracts simply to
aid one party (the borrower) to the contract.367 After an initial burst of
legislative changes, the imposed solution turned out to be largely a dead
end.368 But the informal justice approach—using the law as a means to an
end regardless of the purpose of the original rule—has found some
success.369 Waves of foreclosures hit the housing market just prior to and
throughout the Great Recession, yet by drawing on formal law regarding
the foreclosure process, lawyers on the borrower side managed to dampen
the force of some of these waves.370 Recording and filing requirements—
long neglected by banks, courts, and lawyers—were deployed and
succeeded in slowing down the foreclosure machine.371 The very liquidity
of commercial paper—largely in the form of the bundled mortgages that
helped drive up the housing market and led to the crisis372—created a
situation in which, for example, mortgage holders could not produce
original loan documents. Lawyers and their clients “started questioning
whether the bank bringing foreclosure action was entitled to recover the
property.”373 The scale of the problem in the mortgage markets led banks
and their lawyers to try to use shortcuts, such as, most famously,
robosigning documents.374 Borrower-side lawyers rightly attacked such
practices.375 As Nestor Davidson highlighted, the end result was a
366
See Tracie R. Porter, Pawns for a Higher Greed: The Banking and Financial Services
Industry’s Capture of Federal Homeownership Policy and the Impact on Citizen Homeowners, 37
HAMLINE L. REV. 139, 163–66, 176–79 (2014) (discussing banking, financial services and insurance
companies’ success in lobbying the government for favorable regulations).
367
See Shoked, supra note 3, at 460–61 n.133 (collecting cases in which banks successfully
defeated challenges to lending practices in urban areas).
368
See Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the Deep
Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 455, 458–59, 483–87, 491–501 (2012) (stating
that various government reform efforts have failed).
369
See id. at 481–83, 494–95 (discussing the courts’ more stringent approach to foreclosure laws);
Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal, 64
ME. L. REV. 17, 34–38 (2011) (discussing the broad and remedial nature of Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices laws).
370
For a list of possible legal strategies to resist foreclosure and an argument that state courts
should be more receptive to these moves, see Andrew J. Kazakes, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in
Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court Responses, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1396–99 (2010).
371
See Kochan, supra note 264, at 283–97 (presenting ways banks ignored or tried to get around
formal recording requirements).
372
For an explanation of what lay behind the glut of mortgage finance, see Adam J. Levitin &
Susan W. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1181 (2013).
373
Singer, supra note 365, at 518.
374
See Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (2013) (discussing
the lawyers involved in the expedited foreclosure processes associated with the robo-signing scandals).
375
See Gregg H. Mosson, Robosigning Foreclosures: How It Violates Law, Must Be Stopped, and
Why Mortgage Law Reform Is Needed to Ensure the Certainty and Values of Real Property, 40 W. ST.
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resurgence of formalism among progressive public interest lawyers.376 A
borrower-side strategy of pushing for strict enforcement of process
requirements found support in a series of cases brought by state Attorneys
General that alleged that banks had engaged in discriminatory and
deceptive lending practices.377 Together they undermined the concentrated
property interests of banks, destabilizing their holdings as well as their
expectation that the law would favor them over defaulting borrowers.
Though the title “homeowner” is usually given to borrowers immediately
following purchase, regardless of how much is owed to the lending
institution, in practice, the defense of these borrower-homeowners amounts
to a claim-based attempt to secure homeowner communities that is fairly
analogous to how eviction defense can secure tenant communities.
These are property-centric examples of the larger lesson that jaded
students and professors sometimes forget: lawyers matter. They show that
legal assistance for vulnerable people and communities can disrupt normal
expectations regarding ownership and power. The lesson is not one that has
gone unheeded by defenders of the status quo. As David Luban showed in
his essay, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public
Interest Lawyers, the very success of attorneys advocating for the poor
inspired a reactionary response designed to squeeze out and “muzzle”
public interest lawyers and their clients.378 It is only because legal aid
attorneys are effective that Governor Ronald Reagan demonized them,
President Reagan gutted their funding, and Congress in 1996 handcuffed
legal aid offices with arguably unethical restrictions on how they can
practice law.379 Even with these restrictions, there is still space for lawyers
for the poor to make a difference. Providing access to legal assistance itself
makes a difference, but, as Gary Smith argues, advocates for poor
communities can, and perhaps should, reclaim some of the transformative
ambitions of the early mission of legal services during the War on
Poverty.380 Or, to frame this in terms of the argument in this Article,
U. L. REV. 31, 70 (2012) (highlighting the role plaintiff-side lawyers played in “bringing robosigning to
light”).
376
See Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 389, 394–96 (2013) (explaining that the emerging mortgage jurisprudence ironically underscores
pluralist conceptions of property).
377
See Brescia, supra note 369, at 30–34 (2011) (summarizing the cases and resulting
settlements).
378
David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers,
91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 245 (2003).
379
See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 14–16, 29–34, 36–37 (2007) (discussing
government frustration of legal aid services goals).
380
See Gary F. Smith, Poverty Warriors: A Historical Perspective on the Mission of Legal
Services, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 34 passim (2011) (stating that advocates may revisit the original
mission of the first legal services program).

2015]

DESTABILIZING PROPERTY

463

creatively using existing law to destabilize the ordinary working of
property is another way lawyers matter, even if doing so involves working
against property.
B. Pragmatic Resistance
Sometimes more is needed. Property law and the economic
stratification of our society are both remarkably resilient and resistant to
meaningful change. The current period of our history is a good illustration
of these complementary—and mutually reinforcing—features of the law,
of economics, and of their interaction. Since roughly the oil shocks of the
1970s, productivity gains and the incomes of most workers have
diverged.381 After World War II, the United States enjoyed a period of
phenomenal and broadly shared economic growth. But since the 1970s the
wealthiest one (and especially 0.1) percent of Americans have captured
most of the rewards of productivity gains, which have continued to rise
much as they did before the 1970s.382 In contrast, working-class Americans
have barely seen their incomes rise. Where households have gotten ahead it
has been the result not of income gains but of switching from a single wage
earner to the expectation that all adults, regardless of parental obligations,
participate in the wage economy.383 The Great Recession put an
exclamation point on the problems of the New Gilded Age. Young people,
even relatively privileged college graduates, including law school
graduates, face a difficult job market marked by unemployment and
underemployment.384 Moreover, they can expect a prolonged period of
lower earnings as a consequence of the state of the economy when they are
entering the workforce.385 It is no wonder that they are delaying what had
381
See, e.g., Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13106, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w13106.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4VB-EM9C] (stating that it is “problematic that recent productivity
gains have not significantly raised incomes for most American workers”).
382
See Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Inequality: A Story of Policy Choices, NEW LABOR F., Aug.
4, 2014, at 4–5 (“Much of the increase in equality has taken place in the top 1 percent.”); see also Josh
Bivens et al., Raising America’s Pay: Why It’s Our Central Economic Policy Challenge, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (June 4, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/raising-americas-pay/ [http://perma.cc/4XV4Z83M] (emphasizing the urgency of addressing unequal wage growth in the United States). Perhaps the
best resource on understanding income inequality over the last several decades is the State of Working
America website, http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/, and the associated report which was last
published in print form in 2012 and is now presented through interactive charts. See generally
LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 53–138 (12th ed. 2012) (addressing the
centrality of income inequality for American families and households).
383
See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE 97–122 (2003).
384
See STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 265 (illustrating the economic challenges for twenty-yearolds).
385
See Lisa B. Kahn, The Long-Term Labor Market Consequences of Graduating from College in
a Bad Economy, 17 LABOUR ECON. 303 (2010); Philip Oreopoulos et al., The Short- and Long-Term
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been typical life stages such as moving out of their parents’ houses,386
marrying,387 having kids, and purchasing a first home.388 It is not just the
young whose prospects are bleak. Many seniors have been unable to find
new jobs following layoffs at the start of the recession.389 Some sectors in
the economy are doing well, but the strength of others, such as retailers of
luxury goods and high-end car companies, speaks volumes about the rise
of inequality in the country.
The problem of inequality is not necessarily new nor news, but the
Great Recession has been instrumental in bringing attention to these issues.
As early as 2008, Julie Nice observed, “[a]t this particular moment in
American history, poverty is making a rare appearance as an urgent
concern on the political radar screen.”390 The Occupy movement, which
began in September 2011, brought the idea of the 1% into the popular and
political lexicon and helped spur a national dialogue about poverty and
inequality.391 In 2014, a 700-page work by a French economist, Thomas
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century,392 attacking the inequality of

Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession: Hysteresis and Heterogeneity in the Market for College
Graduates 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12159, 2006),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12159.pdf [http://perma.cc/W49W-3GCQ] (“Graduating during a
recession leads to significantly lower earnings at the beginning of an individual’s labor market . . . .”).
386
See, e.g., RAKESH KOCHHAR & D’VERA COHN, FIGHTING POVERTY IN A TOUGH ECONOMY,
AMERICANS MOVE IN WITH RELATIVES 1 passim (2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011
/10/Multigenerational-Households-Final1.pdf [http://perma.cc/QRZ6-WXBV] (acknowledging the
popular choice of Americans to live with relatives); Adam Davidson, It’s Official: The Boomerang
Kids Won’t Leave, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/magazine/
its-official-the-boomerang-kids-wont-leave.html?_r=0 (discussing the prevalence of young adults
living with their parents).
387
Poverty and inequality are not only changing when people marry, but they are also making
marriage’s meaning and experience differ across classes. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN,
MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); KATHRYN
EDIN & MARIA J. KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE
MARRIAGE 111 (2011) (illustrating that while women may still be interested in marriage, many are
putting it off in favor of economic stability and other factors).
388
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 2014, at 12–16 (2014) (discussing how the difficult economy has contributed to young adults’
reluctance to purchase homes).
389
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-445, UNEMPLOYED OLDER
WORKERS: MANY EXPERIENCE CHALLENGES REGAINING EMPLOYMENT AND FACE REDUCED
RETIREMENT SECURITY (2012) (discussing the employment challenges faced by older workers).
390
Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of
Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 664 (2008).
391
See Sarah Leberstein & Anastasia Christman, Occupy Our Occupations: Why “We Are the
99%” Resonates with Working People and What We Can Do to Fix the American Workplace, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073, 1073–75 (2012) (“The experts have named ‘Occupy’ 2011’s word of the
year.” ).
392
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013).
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393

modern capitalism, became a best seller. Yet in many respects very little
has changed, despite both forty years of relative wage stagnation for the
median worker and the increased attention that issues of poverty and
inequality have received since the start of the Great Recession. Proposals
to change the law have largely gone nowhere. On the finance side, tax
incentives continue to flow to hedge fund managers, “too big to fail”
institutions remain too big to fail, wrongdoing has been largely swept
under the rug through settlements instead of criminal punishment,394 and,
perhaps most troubling, stock market returns seem to no longer be tied to
what is happening on Main Street. Property law has remained equally
resistant and resilient to change in the face of economic challenges. In
2010, Nestor Davidson and Rashmi Dyal-Chand observed that the
economic crisis “made basic questions about the nature of property a daily
aspect of our cultural and political dialogue.”395 They continued, “[i]t is too
early to draw definitive conclusions about the residue that this crisis will
leave on property doctrine.”396 Five years later, definitive conclusions
perhaps are still difficult, but it appears as if, at most, only minor residue
will be left. The crisis, and the opportunity to make significant changes,
seems to have been wasted after all.397 Or perhaps more accurately,
property law once again showed its resilience.
While the last sub-Part showed that property law can be a destabilizing
tool, this sub-Part looks at a more radical alternative—destabilizing
property through confrontation and resistance. Given the state’s role in
protecting private property, challenges to how property is held often must
approach or even cross criminal lines for destabilization to occur. But
without confrontation, those with privilege may choose to ignore those
who are excluded from the benefits of property or may not see the benefits
of changing the role property plays in society.398 My argument is heavily
indebted to the pioneering work of Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal,
whose book, Property Outlaws, showed how rule violators can improve
property law.399 Using an expansive range of examples, Peñalver and
Katyal argue that property law is and can be improved by paying attention
393
Sam Tanehaus, Hey, Big Thinker: Thomas Piketty, the Economist Behind ‘Capital in the
Twenty-First Century’ Is the Latest Overnight Intellectual Sensation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2014, at
ST1.
394
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 12 (2014) (exploring the pattern of settlement and non-prosecution that occurs when
powerful corporations that are valuable to the economy have committed crimes).
395
Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 359, at 1609.
396
Id. at 1610.
397
See id. at 1611 (discussing the opportunity afforded by the crisis to re-evaluate the nature of
property law).
398
As Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams note, “the decision to ignore distribution [is] a
distributive choice.” Fennell & McAdams, supra note 205, at 3.
399
PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 16.
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to a wide range of “outlaw” behavior, from the lunch counter sit-ins of the
civil rights movement to the widespread copyright infringement of illegal
music downloading.400 When they are frequent or are tied to a valid moral
claim, violations of the law may reflect a need to revisit the law. Having
shown the value of such outlaw behavior, Peñalver and Katyal conclude by
arguing that property protections and enforcement mechanisms should not
become so effective that they foreclose all space to violate or challenge the
law.401 Though they do not frame their argument in the same way, Peñalver
and Katyal’s masterful work and the examples they collected are in line
with the idea that the law must be periodically destabilized and open to
such challenges. My point of departure from Peñalver and Katyal is that I
see more radical potential of rule breaking to destabilize property holdings
and protections than envisioned by their more reasonable approach.
One of the most damaging myths regarding low-income people and
communities is that they are powerless to resist oppressive structures. In
fact resistance and rule violations occur all the time, in subtle and not-sosubtle ways. In his description of the all-encompassing nature of the law as
it relates to and controls the lives of poor people, Austin Sarat explained
that “being on welfare means having a significant part of one’s life
organized by a regime of legal rules invoked by officials to claim
jurisdiction over choices and decisions which those not on welfare would
regard as personal and private.”402 But even with the law playing such a
large role in their lives, Sarat went on to note that “[r]esistance exists sideby-side with power and domination.”403 These two linked observations are
found throughout the literature on the lives of the poor. Examples of
people resisting structural oppression, including oppression done under the
color of property law, are found throughout history. Indeed, there has been
a major effort by contemporary scholars to unearth these resistance stories.
And while the goal of such resistance sometimes is to incorporate the
concerns of the subordinated into the law, it is often to fight against or
overthrow the oppressive system completely. As rights scholars have
pointed out in the civil rights and social movement areas, channeling such
resistance through the law—here, working with property law—may
wrongly blunt demands for change and alter the nature of the demands. But
what would resistance, working against property law, look like and what
could it accomplish? Though one can imagine many answers to these
questions, from, at one extreme, the idea that destabilization would
accomplish very little to, at the opposite extreme, that it would lead to
400

Id. at 64–70, 84–86.
Id. at 143.
402
Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of
the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344 (1990).
403
Id. at 346.
401
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anarchy, I suggest a more optimistic view of deliberate efforts to
destabilize property protections. In this sub-Part I argue that working
against property law may be the best way to mobilize Americans and to
force a national debate about the role property law plays in maintaining the
status quo. Resistance can be a tool to generate a political response—
something a work-with-property approach may not be able to accomplish.
Progressives have long argued that the national “ideology” of what is
required for success, which focuses on individual hard work, is not
accurate.404 Arguably, the country is reaching a tipping point when it
comes to rejecting the Horatio Alger myth in favor of broad-based
recognition of the importance of class and inequality.405 Confrontation and
resistance to existing power structures such as the exclusionary power of
property may be the best tools to provide the final necessary push. Issues
of inequality and opportunity are pressing enough across the ideological
spectrum that two large conservative think tanks, the American Enterprise
Institute and the Heritage Foundation, joined in an unlikely partnership
with two more progressive think tanks, the Brookings Institute and the
Urban Institute, to form the Economic Mobility Project.406 The project’s
reports, as well as the work of other scholars working on economic
mobility, make for sobering reading. Among their findings, “Americans
raised at the bottom and top of the family income ladder are likely to
remain there as adults, a phenomenon known as ‘stickiness at the ends.’”407
The same report notes “[b]lacks are more likely to be stuck in the bottom
and more likely to fall from the middle of the family income and wealth
ladders than are whites.”408 After introducing the American idea that hard
work leads to economic success, another report notes “[the] rags-to-riches
story is more prevalent in Hollywood than in reality. In fact, 43 percent of
Americans raised at the bottom of the income ladder remain stuck there as
adults, and 70 percent never even make it to the middle.”409 To get a good
overall understanding of economic mobility in the United States, it is worth
404
See JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF
OWNERSHIP 97 (1994) (“That popular ideology—that what one earns is commensurate with one’s value
or effort and hence just—is pervasive and dangerous.”).
405
See Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 41
(discussing the effects of material inequality).
406
See Economic Mobility Project: Partners, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www.pew
trusts.org/en/archived-projects/economic-mobility-project/partners [http://perma.cc/F7CN-8KLB] (last
visited Sept. 5, 2015). The Economic Mobility Project is now hosted by the Pew Charitable Trusts. See
Financial Services and Mobility: Overview, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www.pewtrusts.org/
en/projects/financial-security-and-mobility [http://perma.cc/95GA-HJXG] (last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
407
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: ECONOMIC MOBILITY ACROSS
GENERATIONS 2 (2012).
408
Id. at 20.
409
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, MOVING ON UP: WHY DO SOME AMERICANS LEAVE THE BOTTOM
OF THE ECONOMIC LADDER, BUT NOT OTHERS? 1 (2013).
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quoting Jared Bernstein at length:
These two concepts—intra- and intergenerational mobility—
both shed light on the fluidity, or lack thereof, of class in
America. The evidence presented here shows some degree of
mobility: families do change [relative positions], and the
correlation between parents and children is far from one. Yet
two important points emerge. First, there is not as much
mobility as American mythology might lead one to expect.
Most families end up at or near the same relative income
position in which they start, and, as noted, when it comes to
parent/children income correlations, the apple does not fall
very far from the tree. Second, the rate of mobility has not
increased and may have fallen. The United States is a more
unequal society, yet Americans have not become more
mobile.410
This is a damning conclusion, but the idea of American mobility has
one final line of defense. Even if we accept that the United States is not
perfect, if the economic structure is more permeable than other
alternatives, it can be celebrated. Unfortunately, this is not the case: “the
relationship between parental socioeconomic advantage and child
outcomes is the strongest” in the United States compared to similar
developed countries.411 As the American Enterprise Institute recently
noted, economic mobility in the United States is significantly lower than in
other countries.412
The mismatch between the country’s fairly rigid class/caste structure
and public perceptions regarding economic opportunity creates the
potential for resistance strategies to resonate politically. It is hard
prospectively to say what sort of challenges to property protections will
arise and which will be successful. But past examples of resistance that
410
Jared Bernstein, Economic Mobility in the United States: How Much Is There and Why Does It
Matter?, in ENDING POVERTY IN AMERICA: HOW TO RESTORE THE AMERICAN DREAM 23, 26 (John
Edwards et al. eds., 2007).
411
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DOES AMERICA PROMOTE MOBILITY AS WELL AS OTHER
NATIONS? 2–5 (2011) (comparing mobility in the United States with mobility in the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Australia, Finland, Denmark, and Canada); see also Julia B. Isaacs,
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succeeded in destabilizing property demonstrate that challenges to
accepted property right protections can be transformative. The most wellknown examples of such resistance are perhaps the Civil Rights, Women’s
Rights, and, more recently, Gay Rights movements. In each of these cases,
the claims were and are deeply unsettling to many established
expectations, including exclusionary property-based expectations. The
central claim of these movements—that all men and women are equal
regardless of skin color or sexual orientation—is seen as so self-evidently
true that it is easy to lose sight of the profoundly disruptive nature of both
these movements and their claims.413 All three of these movements
challenged the existing power structure, prying open things like public
accommodations, public and private benefits, and rights to hold property.
They did so in the face of counterarguments that tradition, private rights of
association, and long-standing state preferences should not be undermined.
One can see their successes in two ways. First, as the natural result of the
country’s founding principles, a point that Martin Luther King, Jr. drove
home in his I Have a Dream speech. King drew upon the Declaration of
Independence, expressing his hope that “this nation will rise up, [and] live
out the true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal.’”414 Second, the successes show the
importance of mobilization. African-Americans did not just ask the nation
to “cash a check,” as King put it; they demanded it in demonstrations
across the country.415 Resistance took many forms—yes, bus boycotts and
marches, but also sit-ins and voter registration drives—and while King’s
non-violent approach is rightly celebrated, it was not the only form of
resistance in the movement.416 Furthermore, non-violence is not the same
as law-abiding, as is powerfully attested to by King’s many arrests and his
Letter from a Birmingham Jail.417 An honest assessment would
acknowledge that successes that have occurred—not only for the civil
rights movement but also for the women’s and gay rights movements—
were a result of the coming together of both of these strategies.
413
See, e.g., Trina Jones, Occupying America: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream,
and the Challenge of Socio-Economic Inequality, 57 VILL. L. REV. 339, 341–42 (2012) (discussing the
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414
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415
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1963–65 (1998).
416
See, e.g., CHARLES E. COBB JR., THIS NONVIOLENT STUFF’LL GET YOU KILLED: HOW GUNS
MADE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT POSSIBLE (2014) (detailing the use of weapons and violence in
the civil rights movement).
417
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963) (on file with the
Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute at Stanford University).

470

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:397

Mobilization and resistance forced changes in part by taking advantage of
the space provided by societal structures such as the popular understanding
of the nature of the country. Successful resistance campaigns will have to
find similar sweet spots to challenge the systematic exclusionary effects of
property.
I want to suggest that one possible strategy for destabilizing property is
focusing mobilization on exposing the contrast between the protection of
the property interests of the wealthy compared to the lack of protection
provided to low-income people and communities. Such a demand by the
subordinated is relatively straightforward; your property rights do not
deserve protection if my rights are not going to be protected. What is
destabilizing about this demand is that it inverts the ordinary political
demand that property rights enjoyed by others be extended. Progressive
property is an example of an ordinary political demand in that it advocates
for the excluded, for non-owners, and for community or social interests,
but it does so without showing how the politics around property are to
change. The destabilization claim is more radical (or more “realist”418) but
it can be seen in numerous recent protest movements. Though the Occupy
movement spread, it began by claiming space in the financial heart of
America. Union workers who picket or engage in sit-down strikes aim to
block customer and employer access to the very facilities that are being
protested. The housing affordability advocates in San Francisco who
blocked “Google Buses” did so to target the people who are seen as pricing
them out of the city.419 And when the tenants of entire buildings band
together, refusing to pay a rent increase, their financial vulnerability
suddenly becomes felt in a personal and financial way by the property
owner. The point of these examples of “property disobedience”420 is not to
suggest that any one of these strategies is the best route forward but to
show that resistance can create political possibilities that might not exist
absent confrontation. Resistance can take many forms, including
threatened actions or protests: credible threats may serve a politically
galvanizing role similar to more active destabilization efforts.
Destabilization involves lessening the inequities involved in respecting
property rights. As the legal realists understood, to say someone has a
property right to something is to say that he or she has a right to that thing

418
See Smith, supra note 37, at 287 (noting that “[a r]ealist might want to treat [stability] as yet
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ma.cc/W5NK-YGK9] (describing how anti-eviction activists that associate the expeditious growth of
technology to rising housing prices blocked Google buses that shuttle employees to Silicon Valley from
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and that others are obligated to respect that right. But where economic
mobility is such that the lottery of birth plays a largely determinative role
in peoples’ access to property throughout their lifetimes, asking that the
property rights of others be respected is asking a lot. Selectively not
respecting, or threatening not to respect, all property rights may force
owners to recognize the extent to which their claims rely upon the social
contract. Where that contract is broken—as, I would argue, it is when
people are denied meaningful and equal access to property—it may be
appropriate to lessen or even imperil property rights. And it is in
destabilization’s ability to force recognition that the protection of property
rights is premised on some degree of fairness that destabilization offers
something not offered by approaches that work for or with property.
Working against property may sound radical, but the alternative, leaving in
place an inequitable system and locking in place inequality through strict
forms of property protection and adherence to property law, is surely just
as radical.422
V. CONCLUSION
My hope in writing this Article is not to disparage existing property
scholarship. Despite the critiques of progressive property contained in this
Article, I am largely in agreement with the progressive property agenda
and agree with the scholars writing from that perspective. Similarly,
although it is no doubt clear that I would not classify myself as
conservative, I find the work of information theorists enlightening and
largely agree with their descriptive characterizations of property law. But
until we recognize the extent to which status quo bias informs our views on
both the structure of the law and how well the law works, we will continue
to tinker, looking for ways to work with property law rather than
recognizing the need for more radical change. The hope is that challenging
the status quo will “release[] the mental grip of conventional structures on
the capacity to consider alternatives.”423 Although there are libertarian
gripes about our system and occasional spikes in public concern about the
security of property rights,424 property ownership in general is quite secure
and owners rightly have little concern that their property rights will be
diminished in any significant way. Perhaps in the interests of those
421
Serkin, supra note 198, at 114 (“[R]ights are generally zero sum. Expanding one person’s right
to exclude means limiting another’s right to be included (or to access a resource).”).
422
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approach compared to an efficient welfare maximizing system); Purdy, supra note 31, at 11–15
(arguing that property should be measured by how far it falls short of its ideal).
423
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424
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MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2108–14 (2009) (discussing the public outcry that followed Kelo).
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excluded it is time to selectively destabilize property.
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